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PROTECTING OUR AT-RISK COMMUNITIES FROM THE
GROUND(WATER) UP: CAFOs, THE CLEAN WATER ACT,
AND A FRAMEWORK FOR OFFERING CLARITY TO AN
IMPRECISE MAUI TEST
ABSTRACT
For rural communities across the country, the problems associated with
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) are nothing new. These
industrial-sized operations emit a tremendous amount of waste, polluting the
surrounding air, land, and water. In many regions, minority, indigent, and
uneducated groups disproportionately bear the ill-effects of these inhumane
operations. Under the Clean Water Act, CAFOs are explicitly included in the
definition of a point source and are thus subject to the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting requirements, which
regulates the discharge of pollutants. However, many operations do not fit
within this regulatory scheme as they do not directly discharge to navigable
waters. In April 2020, the Supreme Court held in County of Maui v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund that point sources do not actually need to discharge directly into
jurisdictional waters to fall within the ambit of the NPDES permitting program;
instead, a “functional equivalent” of a direct discharge will suffice. Applying
this “functional equivalent” doctrine to encompass select instances of CAFO
groundwater contamination would give our rural communities a real avenue to
meaningfully combat environmental injustices that had previously been just a
reality with which they had to cope.
This Comment argues that the Maui doctrine can uniquely work as a
doctrinal tool against concentrated animal feeding operations that contaminate
surface waters through groundwater, placing those operations under the scope
of the NPDES regulatory framework and providing multi-faceted relief to
affected communities. It explores the difficulties involved with establishing
sufficient scientific linkage on the issue of groundwater contamination by
CAFOs and why that task is far from insurmountable. It then spotlights the
application of the Maui doctrine to actual, real-world CAFOs and offers factors,
goals, and directives that bring CAFOs that pollute into nearby waterbodies
through groundwater squarely within the ambit of the Clean Water Act. Finally,
this Comment discusses the substantial environmental implications of CAFO
regulation and this Comment’s utility for other foreseeable applications of the
Maui doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
What imagery do we associate with farmlands? Some may mistakenly
believe the breeding grounds that source America’s carnivorous appetite situate
on rustic mom-and-pop farms where families work hard and children frolic in
the haystacks—one great big happy scene from a country music song. That
idyllic image of cows grazing under open green pastures with a bright red barn
in the background is, of course, now largely an illusion. We may have grown up
reading Charlotte’s Web,1 but “the reality for the vast majority of the more than
9 billion animals raised for food each year in the U.S. does not bear even a
passing resemblance to Wilbur’s world.”2 Instead, concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs) are now responsible for over ninety-nine percent of the
roughly ten billion animals slaughtered for food each year in the United States.3
CAFOs are corporate industrial-sized livestock operations and can house
hundreds to thousands of animals, depending on the animal.4 The harm from
CAFOs comes in significant part from the overwhelming waste that these farms
produce.5 In addition to harming our water resources,6 the pollution from these
operations significantly contributes to climate change,7 worsens air quality,8 and
drives down property values.9 But perhaps most importantly, inhabitants in
regions laden with CAFOs face a myriad of serious health complications,10
including irreversible brain damage, burning eyes, and “blue baby syndrome”
1

E.B. WHITE, CHARLOTTE’S WEB (1st ed. 1952).
Paloma Sisneros-Lobato, Industrial Farming Is Not as You’ve Pictured, NRDC (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/paloma-sisneros-lobato/industrial-farming-not-youve-pictured.
3
Christine Ball-Blakely, CAFOs: Plaguing North Carolina Communities of Color, 18 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL’Y 4, 4 (2017).
4
For a breakdown of CAFO regulatory classifications, see U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY
DEFINITIONS OF LARGE CAFOS, MEDIUM CAFOS, AND SMALL CAFOS (n.d.), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2015-08/documents/sector_table.pdf.
5
Kai Olson-Sawyer, First-Ever Court Victory Holds CAFO Accountable for Water Pollution, CIV. EATS
(Feb. 9, 2012), https://civileats.com/2012/02/09/first-ever-court-victory-holds-cafo-accountable-for-water-pollution/
(“According to the EPA, ‘a single dairy cow produces approximately 120 pounds of wet manure per day,’ which
is ‘equivalent to that of 20–40 people.’”).
6
See infra Part I.
7
While recognizing the profound impacts CAFOs have on climate change, this Comment omits
discussion of greenhouse gas emissions. For a discussion, see Linda Breggin & Bruce Myers, Tackling the
Problem of CAFOs and Climate Change: A New Path to Improved Animal Welfare?, in WHAT CAN ANIMAL
LAW LEARN FROM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 371, 371–75 (Randall S. Abate ed., 2d ed. 2020).
8
See CARRIE HRIBAR, UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON COMMUNITIES 5, 7 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/ehs/docs/understanding_cafos_nalboh.pdf.
Some common pollutants found in air surrounding CAFOs are ammonia, hydrogen sulfide, and methane. Id. at
5.
9
Id. at 11.
10
See id. at 6 (listing different CAFO emissions and the corresponding health risks associated with those
pollutants).
2
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(also known as infant methemoglobinemia, a condition in which a baby’s skin
turns blue from insufficient oxygen in the blood).11
Furthermore, the “routine feeding of antibiotics” to animals encourages the
development of antibiotic-resistant bacteria that can then inflict catastrophic
consequences on the general population,12 including the possibility of
contributing to the next global pandemic.13 These operations, in many cases, are
disproportionately situated in regions populated by minority,14 indigent,15 and
uneducated groups16 who consequently are the primary bearers of the ill-effects
of these inhumane operations.
There are many limitations when it comes to fighting back against CAFOs.
Due to powerful financial incentives aimed at keeping these operations
humming, at-risk communities face influential special interest groups and
lobbyists that help enact mechanisms that strip these communities of meaningful
ways to fight exploitation, including “ag-gag”17 and right-to-farm laws.18
Furthermore, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) itself has not
effectively provided the requisite information for regulating CAFOs and has

11
See Why Are CAFOs Bad?, SIERRA CLUB, https://www.sierraclub.org/michigan/why-are-cafosbad#feces (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
12
See How CAFOs Contribute to Antibiotic Resistance, IOWA ALL. FOR RESP. AGRIC., https://
cleaniowanow.org/learn-about-the-problem/how-cafos-cause-antibiotic-resistance/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
13
Sisneros-Lobato, supra note 2 (“Antibiotics are precious medicines and their misuse and overuse can
drive the spread of bacterial resistance. . . . Antibiotic resistance remains a significant public health threat and
could lead to the next major pandemic.”); see also Experts Warn Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs) Could Lead to the Next Pandemic, BEYOND PESTICIDES (May 1, 2020), https://beyondpesticides.
org/dailynewsblog/2020/05/experts-warn-concentrated-animal-feeding-operations-cafos-could-lead-to-thenext-pandemic/ (relaying the warnings from scientists that CAFOs are “setting the table for the next pandemic”).
14
One of the most well-documented environmental justice stories is in eastern North Carolina, where
CAFOs dominate the coastal plains. See Wendee Nicole, CAFOs and Environmental Justice: The Case of North
Carolina, 121 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. A182, A183 (2013), https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/full/10.1289/ehp.121a182.
15
See, e.g., Bob Edwards & Anthony E. Ladd, Race, Class, Political Capacity and the Spatial
Distribution of Swine Waste in North Carolina, 1982–1997, 9 N.C. GEOGRAPHER 51, 53 (2001).
16
Even in select areas in the Midwest, such as Iowa where high swine density is not associated with “nonwhites and poor residents,” we still see the “importance of education in providing a buffer against proximity to
swine” and its negative effects. For further discussion, see generally Margaret Carrel, Sean G. Young & Eric
Tate, Pigs in Space: Determining the Environmental Justice Landscape of Swine Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations (CAFOs) in Iowa, 13 INT’L J. ENV’T RSCH. & PUB. HEALTH 849 (2016).
17
The term “ag-gag” refers to anti-whistleblower laws, which “make taking pictures, filming, or
recording on farms and livestock production facilities illegal.” Sonci Kingery, The Agricultural Iron Curtain:
Ag Gag Legislation and the Threat to Free Speech, Food Safety, and Animal Welfare, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
645, 647 (2012).
18
Right-to-farm laws vary by state but generally seek to limit common-law nuisance claims against
farming operations. See Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-toFarm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 87, 88 (2006).
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gone so far as to admit that they “historically paid little attention to the state
CAFO programs.”19
However, the Clean Water Act (CWA) provides an avenue to regulate
CAFOs.20 The CWA is a federal law that established the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permitting program,21 which prohibits
the discharge of any pollutant from any point source22 into navigable waters23
unless the polluter obtains the requisite permit.24 Under the CWA, CAFOs are
explicitly included in the definition of a point source and thus subject to NPDES
permitting.25 However, animal feeding operations (AFOs) need to fulfill certain
size and characteristic requirements before they can be considered CAFOs,26 and
many operations do not fit within this regulatory scheme as they do not directly
discharge to navigable waters.27 But in April 2020, the Supreme Court held in
19
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-03-285, LIVESTOCK AGRICULTURE: INCREASED EPA
OVERSIGHT WILL IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM FOR CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 3
(2003). The EPA additionally “lacks basic information about most CAFOs, including their location, how many
animals they confine, how much waste they produce, and how they dispose of that waste.” Jon Devine & Valerie
Baron, CAFOs: What We Don’t Know Is Hurting Us, NRDC (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nrdc.org/resources/
cafos-what-we-dont-know-hurting-us.
20
The federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) presents another potential avenue for
protecting groundwater from CAFO pollution. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2016)
(known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act following the 1976 amendments of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act); see, e.g., Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of the Env’t, Inc. v. Cow Palace, LLC, 80 F. Supp. 3d
1180, 1223–24 (E.D. Wash. 2015) (extending RCRA to agriculture by holding that manure can, under some
circumstances, qualify as “solid waste” under RCRA). This Comment focuses on the CWA and omits
discussions of the RCRA’s application to groundwater contamination issues.
21
33 U.S.C. § 1342.
22
The CWA defines the term “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may
be discharged.” Id. § 1362(14).
23
“Navigable waters” are defined as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Id.
§ 1362(7). For a current definition of “waters of the United States” (WOTUS) and what it constitutes under the
most recent 2020 Waters of the United States rule promulgated under the Trump Administration, see 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3 (2020) (defining the jurisdiction of the term “WOTUS”). However, this definition had been expected to
broaden under the Biden Administration. See, e.g., Bobby Magill, Biden Swings Waters Pendulum with Final
Resolution
Still
Elusive,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Jan.
29,
2021,
5:30
AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-energy/biden-swings-waters-pendulum-with-finalresolution-still-elusive; U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, Waters of the United States, https://www.epa.gov/wotus
(last visited Dec. 28, 2021) (“On December 7, 2021, the EPA and the Department of the Army . . . announced a
proposed rule to revise the definition of ‘waters of the United States’ . . . to put back into place the pre-2015
definition,” before writing its own rule.).
24
33 U.S.C. § 1342.
25
Id. § 1362(14).
26
See Regulatory Definitions of Large CAFOs, Medium CAFOs, and Small CAFOs, supra note 4.
27
Because the NPDES permit covers CAFOs that discharge into a navigable water, “not all animal
feeding operations are considered point sources for purposes of the CWA.” Madhavi Kulkarni, Out of Sight, but
Not Out of Mind: Reevaluating the Role of Federalism in Adequately Regulating Concentrated Animal Feeding
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County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund that point sources do not actually need
to discharge directly into navigable (and thus jurisdictional) waters to fall within
the ambit of the NPDES permitting program; instead, a “functional equivalent”
of a direct discharge suffices.28 Applying this “functional equivalent” test to
cover particular instances of CAFO groundwater contamination would provide
the nation’s rural communities with a doctrinal tool that can potentially combat
environmental injustices—ones that had previously been flagrant and yet
hopelessly unavoidable—in a meaningful way.
This Comment argues that the “functional equivalent” test can and should
extend the NPDES permitting scheme to select CAFOs that discharge pollutants
into groundwater that ultimately reaches surface waters, and it offers a blueprint
as to how courts should apply Maui’s fact-specific inquiry to reach that
determination with respect to particular CAFOs. This Comment ultimately
proposes an interpretive directive which offers a burden-shifting framework for
the regulation of select CAFOs under the CWA. Although this Comment focuses
on CAFOs, its proposed insights and framework offer similar utility beyond
CAFOs and the courts.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I highlights the alarming need to
protect our waters from the harms of CAFOs, how the laws governing CAFOs
before Maui have been inadequate to achieve that objective, and the emergence
of the Maui doctrine. Part II briefly outlines some basics of groundwater
hydrology before exploring the difficulties involved in establishing sufficient
causation on the issue of groundwater contamination by CAFOs and illustrating
how that task is not insurmountable. Part III then highlights the application of
the Maui doctrine by demonstrating its potential coverage of actual, real-world
CAFOs and argues for factors, goals, and directives that bring CAFOs that
pollute into nearby waterbodies through groundwater squarely within the ambit
of the Clean Water Act and the spirit of the Maui doctrine. Part IV discusses
how the ideas and proposals advanced in this Comment are not only useful in
conversations involving CAFO caselaw, but also in shaping agency memoranda,
state regulations, and other potential applications of the Maui doctrine.
I.

CAFO WATER POLLUTION AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT

The threats to America’s precarious waters have been well-documented.
According to the EPA’s most recent assessment of national water quality, nearly

Operations, 44 WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 285, 288 (2019).
28
140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020).

REN_1.31.22

2022]

1/31/2022 3:15 PM

PROTECTING OUR AT-RISK COMMUNITIES

569

half of American rivers and streams are in “poor biological condition,” which
“can lead to loss of fishing and recreational opportunities.”29 Likewise, “more
than one-third of our lakes are polluted and unfit for swimming, fishing, and
drinking.”30 For these contaminated freshwater sources, nutrient pollution is the
primary type of contamination, within which agricultural pollution leads the
way.31 Harms from these agricultural practices are, in a way, twofold: not only
does the agricultural industry pollute our freshwater, but it also uses a
tremendous amount of that freshwater to operate.32 These combined practices
are especially troubling when considering that America’s groundwater reserves
are ever-dwindling.33 Further, when viewed in the context of climate change and
the additional stresses of saltwater intrusion and other stresses onto aquifers,34
the need to prudently protect our current groundwater resources from pollution
is compelling. Within agricultural pollution, CAFOs are particularly
problematic, producing overwhelming quantities of polluting waste that
threatens water quality.35 This Part provides an overview of the Clean Water Act
as it relates to CAFOs, presents limitations that inhere, and discusses the
emergence of the Maui decision along with subsequent developments.

29
The National Rivers and Streams Assessment 2008/2009, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-03/documents/fact_sheet_draft_variation_march_2016_
revision.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2021). The goal of the CWA is to make waters suitable for their designated
uses, such as for fishing, recreation, agriculture, and industrial purposes. See 40 C.F.R. §131.2 (2015) (“[W]ater
quality standards should, wherever attainable, provide water quality for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish and wildlife and for recreation in and on the water . . . .”).
30
Melissa Denchak, Water Pollution: Everything You Need to Know, NRDC (May 14, 2018), https://
www.nrdc.org/stories/water-pollution-everything-you-need-know; see also National Lakes Assessment (NLA)
2012, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-12/documents/nla_fact_
sheet_dec_7_2016.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2021) (presenting conditions threatening lakes nationwide).
31
Denchak, supra note 30.
32
Id. (“[F]arming and livestock production us[e] about 70% of the earth’s surface water supplies.”).
33
See generally Jon Heggie, Why Is America Running Out of Water?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 12,
2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/03/partner-content-americas-looming-water-crisis/
(highlighting how rising populations and climate change contribute to decreasing precipitation and potential
future water shortages). Heggie’s article additionally notes that groundwater is already over-tapped, as it “is
being pumped faster than it can be naturally replenished.” See id.
34
See generally Timothy R. Green, Makoto Taniguchi, Henk Kooi, Jason J. Gurdak, Diana M. Allen,
Kevin M. Hiscock, Holger Treidel & Alice Aureli, Beneath the Surface of Global Change: Impacts of Climate
Change on Groundwater, 405 J. HYDROLOGY 532, 545 (2011) (discussing the impacts of climate change on
groundwater resources).
35
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: WASTE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 1, 5
(1999), https://www.gao.gov/assets/rced-99-205.pdf. The biggest source of this pollution comes from the more
than “440 million tons of poop” generated by confined animals in America every year. Katie Rose Quandt, 8
Disgusting Facts About Hog Poop, MOTHER JONES (May 21, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/
environment/2014/05/8-disgusting-facts-about-hog-poop/.
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A. CAFOs and the Regulatory Scheme of the Clean Water Act
The main objective of the Clean Water Act is to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”36 Under the
Act’s NPDES permitting program,37 discharges of any pollutant from any point
source into navigable waters is prohibited unless the polluter obtains the
requisite permit.38 A point source is defined as “any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.”39
Under the CWA, CAFOs are explicitly included in the definition of a point
source and thus subject to NPDES permitting.40 The EPA may either regulate
the NPDES permitting system or delegate this responsibility to the States.41
1. Limitations on Enforcement Mechanisms—Discharges into Navigable
Waters
Despite CAFOs’ explicit inclusion in the definition of a point source, many
limitations have moved CAFOs out of the NPDES permitting framework. A
significant reason why many CAFOs do not need a permit, despite being a point
source, is that they operate under a legal fiction42 built upon the premise that
CAFOs do not discharge into navigable waters.43 Subsequently, there is no
requirement to “apply for and obtain pollution discharge permits if there is no
discharge of pollutants from such point sources into navigable waters.”44
In the 2003 CAFO Rule (“2003 Rule”), the EPA most notably revised the
“Duty to Apply” provision.45 Because there was such overwhelming evidence
concerning the potential of CAFOs to discharge into navigable waters, the EPA
36

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
Id. § 1342.
38
Id.
39
Id. § 1362(14).
40
Id. In fact, Congress abstained from categorically recognizing any specific industrial point sources in
every sector except CAFOs. See id.
41
Id. § 1342(b).
42
A legal fiction is a lie that is not meant to deceive. LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 6 (1967). Instead,
many legal fictions are simply “false statement[s] recognized as having utility.” Id. at 9. Blackstone likewise
noted that legal fictions can sometimes be “highly beneficial and useful.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 43 (1765–1769).
43
See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he CWA does not
empower the agency to regulate point sources themselves; rather, EPA’s jurisdiction under the operative statute
is limited to regulating the discharge of pollutants.”).
44
Protection of Environment, 41 Fed. Reg. 11,458, 11,459 (Mar. 18, 1976).
45
See National Pollution Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulations and Effluent Limitation
Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) (NPDES Guidelines and
Standards), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122, 123, 412).
37

REN_1.31.22

2022]

1/31/2022 3:15 PM

PROTECTING OUR AT-RISK COMMUNITIES

571

attempted to mandate that all CAFO owners and operators seek NPDES
permitting, except in very limited situations where those CAFOs affirmatively
demonstrate no potential to discharge.46 However, several provisions of the 2003
Rule were challenged in Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA.47 As a result of that
challenge, the Second Circuit vacated, among other provisions, the provision
that “require[d] CAFOs to apply for NPDES permits or otherwise demonstrate
that they have no potential to discharge.”48 In reaching this decision, the court
determined that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority, which only extends to
actual discharges.49 The court found it problematic that the 2003 Rule attempted
to regulate potential discharges, as opposed to actual discharges, because to
regulate more than “actual” discharges would be to impermissibly regulate the
point sources themselves.50
The 2003 Rule additionally cleared up a longstanding issue of whether
CAFO-related discharges fell under the agricultural stormwater exemption to
the Rule, determining that the exemption applied if the discharges were the result
of precipitation from land application areas where the manure had been properly
applied.51 The Waterkeeper court agreed, determining the following:
[D]ischarges from land areas under the control of a CAFO can and
should generally be regulated, but where a CAFO has taken steps to
ensure appropriate agricultural utilization of the nutrients in manure,
litter, and process wastewater, it should not be held accountable for
any discharge that is primarily the result of “precipitation.”52

The EPA believed that this interpretation of the agricultural stormwater
exemption was necessary to reconcile the exemption and the classification of
CAFOs as a point source.53 The Second Circuit determined that the EPA’s
interpretation, which “[e]ffectively . . . included all areas of the CAFO besides

46

Id. at 7201.
399 F.3d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 2005).
48
Id. at 524.
49
Id. at 505.
50
See id.; Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 156, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Hannah
Connor, Comprehensive Regulatory Review: Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Under the Clean Water
Act from 1972 to the Present, 12 VT. J. ENV’T L. 275, 305 (2011) (discussing the legal challenge to the 2003
Rule’s “Duty to Apply” provision).
51
NPDES Guidelines and Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7267 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 9, 122, 123, 412).
52
Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 509.
53
See Emily Kenyon, Enough of this Manure: Why the EPA Needs to Define the Agricultural Stormwater
Exemption to Limit the “Runoff” from the Alt Court, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1187, 1199 (2017).
47
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the land application area,”54 was based on “a permissible construction” of the
CWA.55
In 2008, the EPA promulgated a new CAFO Rule that introduced a “propose
to discharge” standard in lieu of the 2003 Rule’s already-invalidated “potential
to discharge” standard, requiring CAFOs to apply for a NPDES permit if they
discharged or proposed to discharge.56 This change was likewise challenged and
subsequently struck down when the Fifth Circuit—similar to the Waterkeeper
court with respect to the 2003 Rule—determined that the 2008 Rule was outside
of the EPA’s statutory authority as it would apply to CAFOs who did not actually
discharge.57
These decisions highlight how the evolution of the law has created a catch22 when it comes to CAFO regulation: If the only way to regulate CAFOs is to
catch CAFOs illegally discharging, then how are we going to catch these illegal
discharges if we are not regulating them? One author offered that “[t]he only
conclusion that can be gathered from these rules leaves interpretation of the
CWA in quite the conundrum: because discharges cannot be regulated until they
have already occurred, in order to enforce the CWA with any effectiveness, the
regulated have to violate it.”58 This conundrum illustrates one aspect of how
CAFO enforcement can be problematic.59

54

Id. at 1200.
See Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 509.
56
Revised National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitations
Guidelines for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations in Response to the Waterkeeper Decision (2008 CAFO
Rule), 73 Fed. Reg. 70,418, 70,418 (Nov. 20, 2008).
57
See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 750–51 (5th Cir. 2011) (“This definition thus
requires CAFO operators whose facilities are not discharging to apply for a permit . . . . Accordingly, we
conclude that the EPA’s requirement that CAFOs that ‘propose’ to discharge apply for an NPDES permit is ultra
vires and cannot be upheld.”).
58
Kristin Titley, Environmental Law—Regulation of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations—
Reducing the Nuisance: How Arkansas Can Use its Right-to-Farm Statute to Protect Against the Destruction of
CAFOs, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 495, 505 (2015). See generally Christopher R. Brown, When the
“Plain Text” Isn’t So Plain: How National Pork Producers Council Restricts the Clean Water Act’s Purpose
and Impairs Its Enforcement Against Factory Farms, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 375 (2011) (discussing enforcement
of the Clean Water Act).
59
To provide an illustrative analogy of this scenario, suppose a policeman in a crime-ridden
neighborhood says to the residents, “If we find out about crime in this area, I will come and patrol your
neighborhood. Until then, your neighborhood will not face any surveillance.” In this scenario, as in the scenario
with the EPA and CAFO enforcement, there will never be any crime detection without any police patrolling the
neighborhood, and conversely without any crime detection, there will never be any police patrolling the
neighborhood. Thus, law enforcement is never able to detect crime—or, in the case of the EPA, enforce CAFOs.
55
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2. Limitations on Enforcement Mechanisms—Discharges into Groundwater
Another challenge to efforts to regulate CAFOs is the limitations of the
CWA as it applies to groundwater, as groundwater was purposely left out of the
statute.60 Additionally, the EPA “has never interpreted ‘waters of the United
States’ to include groundwater.”61 Congress “specifically chose not to regulate
groundwater, largely because ‘the jurisdiction regarding groundwaters is so
complex and varied from State to State.’”62
Although groundwater has always been left to the States, the EPA had, prior
to its April 2019 Interpretive Rule, “long considered hydrologically connected
groundwater as covered by the CWA.”63 The EPA stated that while it never
interpreted groundwater as a navigable water, its “longstanding interpretation is
that point source discharge[s] of pollutants to ‘waters of the United States’ via
groundwater with a direct hydrologic connection to surface waters are
discharges subject to the CWA.”64 This exclusion does not change the fact that
the groundwater itself is not a jurisdictional water; rather, the discharge via
groundwater is subject to the CWA because that groundwater has “a direct
hydrologic connection to surface waters.”65
However, in 2019, the EPA reversed course under President Trump. In an
Interpretative Statement addressing whether the NPDES permit program applies
to releases of a pollutant from a point source to groundwater, the EPA
unequivocally shut the door on groundwater regulation.66

60
See Kaela Shiigi, Underground Pathways to Pollution: The Need for Better Guidance on Groundwater
Hydrologically Connected to Surface Water, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 527 (2019) (citing Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 5–6, Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 887 F.3d 637 (4th Cir. 2018) (No. 18268)).
61
U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY & U.S. DEP’T ARMY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR THE CLEAN
WATER RULE: DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES 16 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
default/files/2015-05/documents/technical_support_document_for_the_clean_water_rule_1.pdf
[hereinafter
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT].
62
Id. at 16–17 (quoting S. Rep. No. 414 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3749).
63
See Shiigi, supra note 60, at 528.
64
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 61, at 17.
65
Id.
66
Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge System
Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810, 16,810 (Apr. 23,
2019) (concluding “the CWA is best read as excluding all releases of pollutants from a point source to
groundwater . . . regardless of a hydrologic connection between the groundwater and jurisdictional surface
water” (emphasis added)). This change in the EPA’s stance came as circuit courts around the country wrestled
with this exact question of how to deal with pollutants that pass through groundwater while traveling from a
point source to surface waters. See supra Part I.B (outlining relevant caselaw which led to the EPA
interpretation).
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B. The Emergence of the Maui Doctrine and Its Implications for CAFOs
Those frustrated with the lack of mechanisms for regulating CAFO pollution
may have a new doctrinal tool—one that may indeed bring CAFOs within the
scope of NPDES permitting through groundwater. In the 2020 decision County
of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,67 the Supreme Court ruled on the issue of
whether the Clean Water Act requires a permit when pollutants originate from a
point source but are conveyed to navigable waters through a nonpoint source,
such as groundwater.68 The controversy centered around the word “from,”
specifically questioning what constitutes a pollutant being “from” a point
source.69 Prior to the Court hearing the case, circuits were split on this issue of
discharges to navigable waters via groundwater. The following subparts outline
the various pre-Maui decisions and the courts’ bases behind their legal
determinations on how to treat these discharges.
1. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit in Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utility Co.
held that discharges through groundwater are categorically excluded from the
Act’s permitting requirements.70 There, the court was confronted with coal ash
ponds releasing pollutants through groundwater into nearby Herrington Lake.71
The court rejected both of the plaintiffs’ theories: the “point source” theory72
and the “hydrological connection” theory.73 Taking what it believed to be a
textualist approach, the Sixth Circuit rejected the idea that either groundwater or
the karst74 can be a “discernible” point source.75 The opinion then rejected the
67

140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020).
Id. at 1468.
69
Id. at 1470. The Court opined that what it means to be “from” somewhere can be a nuanced inquiry
that often necessarily needs context; the Court offered the example that “Finland” may not be the right kind of
answer to a question about where you have come from if you were only born there very long ago. Id.
70
905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018), abrogated by 140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020).
71
Id. at 931. The ash ponds additionally sit on top of an aquifer, which expedites the rate at which the
contaminated groundwater flows into the lake. Id.; see also Part II.A (discussing groundwater hydrology).
72
Id. at 933–34.
73
Id. at 934, 936.
74
Karst terrain has distinctive landforms that are created by erosion of highly soluble subsurface rock
like limestone, dolostone, marble, gypsum, and halite, which then creates a series of caverns, tunnels, and paths.
See id. at 931; Caves & Karst: Educational Resources, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fs.usda.gov/managingland/natural-resources/geology/caveskarst/educational-resources (last visited Dec. 17, 2021) (“In karst, spaces
or conduits form in the subsurface that allow for rapid movement of groundwater. Water moves quickly from
the earth’s surface underground in these places.”).
75
The court disagreed that groundwater or the karst could be a discrete conveyance, noting that
groundwater by nature “seeps in all directions, guided only by the general pull of gravity.” Kentucky Waterways,
905 F.3d at 933. The karst-as-a-point-source argument likewise does not hold because it “still treats the
68
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hydrological connection theory because “for a point source to discharge into
navigable waters, it must dump directly into those navigable waters . . . . [There
is] no room for intermediary mediums to carry the pollutants.”76 The Sixth
Circuit believed that “[r]eading the CWA to cover groundwater pollution . . .
would upend the existing regulatory framework.”77
2. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners
utilized a “direct hydrological connection” test.78 Kinder Morgan Energy
Partners, L.P. owned a pipeline that ruptured, spilling several hundred thousand
gallons of gasoline into navigable waters.79 Before reaching those waters, the
pollutants allegedly passed a short distance through groundwater.80 Relying on
the plain text of the CWA, the court held that a discharge into navigable waters
need not come directly from a point source;81 looking to the statute, the opinion
observes that the word “from” in the context of a discharge being “from” a point
source indicates only a starting point, which “need not also convey the discharge
directly to navigable waters.”82
3. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit in Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui adopted a
“fairly traceable” test.83 The County of Maui owned and operated a municipal
wastewater reclamation facility that disposed its treated sewage by injecting the
treated wastewater hundreds of feet underground into groundwater via its
wells.84 That groundwater then traveled roughly half of a mile before reaching
the Pacific Ocean.85 The appellate court determined that the effluent here did
come “from” the injection wells and “just also travel[ed] through groundwater
groundwater system as the point source.” Id. at 934.
76
Id. at 934.
77
Id. at 937.
78
Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 651 (4th Cir. 2018), vacated,
140 S. Ct. 2736 (2020).
79
Id. at 641.
80
Id. Here, the distance traveled was alleged to be about 1,000 feet or less from the pipeline to the
navigable waters. Id. at 651–52.
81
Id. at 649–50.
82
Id. at 650.
83
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1462
(2020).
84
See id. at 742.
85
Id. at 747 (stating that studies “establishe[d] effluent injected into the wells travels[,] . . . appearing in
submarine springs only a half-mile away”).
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before entering the Pacific Ocean.”86 Thus, the county’s wells were point
sources subject to NPDES regulation.87
4. The Supreme Court’s Resolution in Maui
The Supreme Court in Maui resolved this circuit split in 2020, granting
certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision.88 In answering the question
presented,89 the Court reiterated that the main issue here involved an
interpretation of the CWA concerning the word “from” and whether a pollutant
is “from” a point source.90 The majority opinion, penned by Justice Breyer,
began by rejecting both the lower circuit court’s “fairly traceable” approach91
and the county of Maui’s interpretation that the statute’s permitting requirement
did not apply if a pollutant must travel through any amount of groundwater
before reaching navigable waters.92 In determining the appropriate legal
standard, the Court “[did] not defer here to EPA’s interpretation of the statute
embodied in this practice.”93 Regardless of that determination, the Court found
the EPA’s interpretation to be an unreasonable one that would not have received
Chevron deference, as “[t]he absurdity of such an interpretation is obvious
enough.”94 Given that the Court rejected the interpretations offered by both sides

86
Id. at 746. The Ninth Circuit opinion went on to assert that it did not find it important that the pollutants
travelled through the ground before eventually entering surface water because the pollutants were still from a
point source. See id. at 746–47.
87
See id. at 749.
88
County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1462 (2020).
89
The Supreme Court was presented with the question of “whether the Act ‘requires a permit when
pollutants originate from a point source but are conveyed to navigable waters by a nonpoint source,’ here,
‘groundwater.’” Id. at 1468.
90
See id. at 1470.
91
The Court believed that interpretation of the word “from” to such an extreme extent “would require a
permit in surprising, even bizarre circumstances,” and that “Congress did not intend the point source-permitting
requirement to provide EPA with such broad authority as the Ninth Circuit’s narrow focus on traceability would
allow.” Id. at 1471. The Court offered a few examples of these unforeseen circumstances, suggesting “pollutants
carried to navigable waters on a bird’s feathers, or, to mention more mundane instances, the 100-year migration
of pollutants through 250 miles of groundwater to a river.” Id.
92
Id. at 1473 (determining that interpretation was “too narrow, for it would risk serious interference with
EPA’s ability to regulate ordinary point source discharges”).
93
Id. The Court notes that the “EPA itself has changed its mind about the meaning of the statutory
provision.” Id. Furthermore, the Court found noteworthy that no party, including the Solicitor General, “has
asked us to give . . . Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 1474 (citing Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865 (1984) (establishing the doctrine of Chevron
deference)).
94
Id. at 1476. The Court believes that such an interpretation would be “inconsistent with the statutory
text and simultaneously create[] a massive loophole in the permitting scheme that Congress established.” Id.
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as “too extreme,”95 the Court then proceeded to offer what it believed to be a fair
middle ground.
The Supreme Court in Maui, in an effort to balance Congress’s basic aim,96
held that the CWA requires a NPDES permit “when there is a direct discharge
from a point source into navigable waters or when there is the functional
equivalent of a direct discharge.”97 Recognizing the difficulties of determining
what constitutes “functional equivalence,” the Court proceeded to offer some
semblance of guidance. First, the Court noted the obvious importance of time
and distance as factors to heavily consider.98 Second, the majority offered seven
concededly non-exhaustive factors to consider when making determinations of
“functional equivalence”:
(1) [T]ransit time, (2) distance traveled, (3) the nature of the material
through which the pollutant travels, (4) the extent to which the
pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels, (5) the amount
of pollutant entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the
pollutant that leaves the point source, (6) the manner by or area in
which the pollutant enters the navigable waters, [and] (7) the degree to
which the pollution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity.99

The Court believed that this flexible test would be the best option because the
facts of “functional equivalence” analyses can vary widely and different factors
may merit more attention in different situations.100 The Court further adopted a
favorable view of letting judges establish the law through decisions in individual
cases, which would “provide examples that in turn lead to ever more refined
principles.”101 Determining that this common-law approach can be useful, “even
in an era of statutes,”102 the Court indicated a concern that a more absolute, less
fact-dependent test, though perhaps clearer to apply, may be inconsistent with

95

Id.
The Court believed that aim to be “provid[ing] federal regulation of identifiable sources of pollutants
entering navigable waters without undermining the States’ longstanding regulatory authority over land and
groundwater.” Id. at 1476.
97
Id. The Court elaborated that an addition falls within the statutory requirement that it be “from any
point source” when the point source either directly deposits the pollutants into navigable waters “or when the
discharge reaches the same result through roughly similar means.” Id. (emphasis added).
98
See id. (“Time and distance are obviously important.”); id. at 1477 (“Time and distance will be the
most important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case.”).
99
Id. at 1476–77.
100
See id. at 1476 (“But there are too many potentially relevant factors applicable to factually different
cases for this Court now to use more specific language.”).
101
Id. at 1477.
102
Id.
96
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the goals of the CWA.103 At the end of the day, district courts have sufficient
guidance in light of the CWA’s basic objectives; the Court asserted that
“[d]ecisions should not create serious risks either of undermining state
regulation of groundwater or of creating loopholes that undermine the statute’s
basic federal regulatory objectives.”104
In the wake of the 2020 Maui decision, lower courts around the country will
likely need to apply this less-than-clear “functional equivalence” doctrine—not
only to injection wells of wastewater treatment facilities, as was the case in
Maui, but also to challenges in other applications of the CWA as they arise.105
This Comment will argue that courts across the nation should capitalize on the
fact-specific inquiry and develop case law applying the “functional equivalence”
doctrine to CAFOs.
5. Lessons from EPA’s Post-Maui Guidance Memorandum (and
Subsequent Rescission)
On December 10, 2020, more than seven months after the Maui decision, the
EPA released a Federal Register notice with draft guidance that attempted to
clarify how courts should apply the Maui decision and when a NPDES permit
might be necessary under the Clean Water Act.106 However, the EPA rescinded
the guidance in September 2021 under the Biden Administration.107 In the
original Trump-era EPA memorandum, the agency solicited comments for a
thirty-day period and proceeded to adopt the memorandum on January 13,

103
See id. (noting that a more absolute position might “have consequences that are inconsistent with major
congressional objectives, as revealed by the statute’s language, structure, and purposes”).
104
Id.
105
The Maui doctrine finds potential for applicability across many industries and sources of water
pollution; for instance, the issue of septic systems came up in the Petitioner’s Brief and again in oral arguments.
See Brief for Petitioner at 20, Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260); Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Maui,
140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260) (noting Justice Alito asked counsel whether an ordinary family with a septic tank
might be required to have a permit under the Clean Water Act). Although this Comment’s discussion and
solutions may be relevant to issues surrounding septic tanks, it focuses on CAFOs and does not explore the
potential application to septic systems.
106
Applying the Supreme Court’s County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund Decision in the Clean Water Act
Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit, 85 Fed. Reg. 79,489 (proposed Dec. 10,
2020). This document “does not have the force and effect of law and it does not bind the public in any way . . .
[and] intends only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or Agency
policies.” Id.
107
Memorandum from Radhika Fox, Assistant Adm’r, EPA, Rescission of the January 2021 Guidance
Document, “Applying the Supreme Court’s County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund Decision in the Clean Water
Act Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys. Permit Program” (Sept. 15, 2021) (on file at
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-09/maui-rescission-memo_final-09.15.2021.pdf).
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2021.108 The guidance memorandum began by reiterating (1) that an actual
discharge of a pollutant into waters of the United States (WOTUS) is a threshold
condition to triggering the need for a NPDES permit109 and (2) that this
discharge must be from a point source.110 When it comes to determining whether
an actual discharge of a pollutant is flowing to a WOTUS via groundwater and,
if so, whether any such discharge amounts to the functional equivalent of a direct
discharge into a WOTUS, the EPA “recommend[ed] considering whether
conducting a technical analysis would be prudent.”111 The memorandum then
proceeded to highlight that “functional equivalent” discharges presumably
comprise a subset of discharges of pollutants to groundwater that ultimately
reach a jurisdictional water,112 and that the agency anticipated groundwater
permits to be few moving forward.113
Perhaps of greatest significance at the time, the memorandum identified an
additional factor beyond those enumerated by the Maui court—the design and
performance of the system from which the pollutant is released,114 an inquiry
which potentially would have “inform[ed] the scope and extent of the ‘functional
equivalent’ analysis and . . . the factors identified in Maui.”115 Expounding upon
distinctions among systems, the memorandum opined that a system that “is
designed and performs to discharge pollutants from a point source through
groundwater and into a [WOTUS]”116 may be more likely to require a permit.
The memorandum explained the factors as the following:
[I]f a facility is designed and performs with a storage, treatment or
containment system such as a septic system, cesspool or settling pond;
if the facility is operating as a runoff management system, such as with
stormwater controls, infiltration or evaporation systems or other green
infrastructure; or if the facility operates water reuse, recycling or

108
Applying the Supreme Court’s County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund Decision in the Clean Water Act
Section 402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Program, 86 Fed. Reg. 6, 321 (proposed
Dec. 10, 2020).
109
Memorandum from EPA on Applying the Supreme Court’s County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund
Decision in the Clean Water Act Section 402 Nat’l Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys. Permit Program 1
(January 21, 2021).
110
Id. at 1–2.
111
Id. at 4.
112
Id. at 6.
113
Id. at 6–7.
114
Id. at 7.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 8.
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groundwater recharge facilities, and these system components in fact
abate discharges of pollutants to [WOTUS].117

This scheme tended to require permits for systems designed to discharge into
groundwater more than for systems that end up doing so incidentally, and thus
the memorandum excluded entire classes of pollutants.118
This memorandum, drafted under the Trump Administration, attempted to
limit Maui to its particular facts and give courts a path to largely disregard the
Maui decision.119 The Trump-era EPA attempted to construct a narrow
interpretation of Maui, under which the “functional equivalent” test only
covered discharges designed to go directly into groundwater.120 Although the
EPA had discretion in issuing this memorandum and such identification of
additional relevant factors was specifically contemplated by the Maui
decision,121 these factors lacked the force and effect of law. Furthermore, this
guidance memorandum came in the eleventh hour of a Trump Administration
that was attempting to enact many last-minute (and arguably anti-)
environmental policies.122

117

Id.
For example, mining, agriculture, CAFOs, and coal ash ponds contribute to water pollution without
being designed to do so. See id. at 7.
119
Others share this Comment’s sentiment that a keen interpretation of the memorandum detects a subtle
but unmistakable intent to limit Maui. For example, as put by Anna Viele, “[a]ll of these suggestions signal the
Trump EPA would rather encourage fewer instances of required NDPES permits being issued.” Anna Viele,
EPA’s Groundwater Guidance is Vague, Not Likely to Be Finalized, BICK LAW LLP (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.bicklawllp.com/our-insights/functional-equivalency/; see also Juan Carlos Rodriguez, EPA’s
Groundwater Guidance Leaves Permitting Murkiness, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2020, 8:34 PM), https://www.law360.
com/articles/1335754/epa-s-groundwater-guidance-leaves-permitting-murkiness (“[The memorandum] seems
to paint a picture of an EPA that’s reluctant to endorse a broad view of new permitting authority.”).
120
EPA, supra note 109, at 7.
121
See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1477 (2020) (“EPA, too, can provide
administrative guidance (within statutory boundaries) in numerous ways . . . .”).
122
See, e.g., Isaac Arnsdorf, Lydia DePillis, Dara Lind, Lisa Song, Moiz Syed & Zipporah Osei, Tracking
the Trump Administration’s “Midnight Regulations,” PROPUBLICA (Nov. 25, 2020), https://projects.propublica.
org/trump-midnight-regulations/ (listing dozens of arguably anti-environmental rules pushed through in the final
weeks of the Trump Administration, including the exemption of certain polluters from EPA greenhouse gas
regulations and exclusion of scientific studies from environmental policymaking, among others).
118
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Many predicted that the Biden Administration would rescind the Trump-era
memorandum123—a prediction which proved correct.124 The recission asserted
that the agency’s prior position “was issued without proper deliberation” and
vowed “to apply site-specific, science-based evaluations” to evaluate these
discharges in the meantime as it considered how to proceed.125 This back-andforth is a reminder of two things: (1) environmental protection does not escape
the tides of politics, and (2) the judiciary still has ultimate authority as long as
these interpretations lack the force of law. The power, in short, still lies within
the courts.
II. HYDROLOGY OF GROUNDWATER AND ESTABLISHING SUFFICIENT
CAUSATION
To sufficiently allege in a CWA legal challenge that the Maui doctrine might
apply to a CAFO, a plaintiff must fulfill the requirements of Article III
standing.126 To establish the requisite causal connection between the injury and
the discharge, “Article III only requires the plaintiff to show that the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct.”127 Under this standard, a suit “need
not establish to a scientific certainty that the defendant’s action alone caused the
precise injury sustained by the plaintiff in order for the plaintiff to have
standing,”128 and “[l]aboratory testing indicating the presence of pollution may
demonstrate a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the

123

Anna Viele writes the following:
This [guidance] is not likely to continue with the EPA under Biden. In fact, critics suggest this
memo seems to be written with the assumption there would be a second term for Donald
Trump. . . . The Biden administration is not likely to endorse this policy, and may very well
dispense with it shortly after taking office. Even in this unlikely event the administration does
not prioritize retracting this policy, it’s not likely to have much effect, given its broad scope and
lack of specificity.

Viele, supra note 119; see also Rodriguez, supra note 119 (“This is the dying gasp of an administration that tried
and failed to gut the Clean Water Act in the Supreme Court. . . . They are one foot out the door and we hope and
expect that the Biden administration will throw this in the dumpster.” (quoting Earthjustice attorney David
Henkin)).
124
Memorandum from Radhika Fox, supra note 107.
125
See id.
126
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1992) (discussing the requirements to
satisfy constitutional standing under Article III).
127
Colleen K. Sanson, Proof of Standing in Enviornmental Citizen Suits, 157 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS
3d 1, § 4 (Sept. 2021).
128
Id. Additionally, where a plaintiff has alleged that a particular polluting source is the cause of her
injury, and the owner of that source does not offer an alternative culprit, the “fairly traceable” requirement “can
be said to be fairly met.” Sierra Club v. Franklin Cnty. Power of Ill., LLC, 546 F.3d 918, 926–27 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citing Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000)).
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plaintiff’s harm.”129 This “fairly traceable” standard, if unmet, will result in a
failure to state a legally cognizable claim.130 Therefore, to establish Article III
standing, a CWA claim must sufficiently demonstrate a causal link that the
CAFO is polluting into groundwater that in turn feeds into jurisdictional surface
waters.
This Part demonstrates that establishing causation—that a CAFO in fact
does discharge into groundwater and such discharge causes surface water
contamination—is not an insurmountable task in light of our existing body of
scientific knowledge concerning groundwater flow and ever-emerging
developments in pollutant tracing. This task is easily achievable, particularly
when considered against the backdrop of existing legal standards pertaining to
sufficient demonstration of Article III causation.
Section A of this Part provides a brief overview of the basics of groundwater
hydrology and the difficulties that inhere when it comes to establishing sufficient
scientific linkage between CAFOs and ground and surface water contamination.
Section B explores scientific studies that have linked CAFOs to groundwater
contamination and emergent scientific testing mechanisms available to CWA
plaintiffs. Additionally, section B describes how those tools sufficiently meet
the existing requirements of Article III standing as established by existing case
law.
A. Groundwater Hydrology and the (Not So Difficult) Task of Proving
Connection
Groundwater is located beneath the land’s surface, moves underground in
tremendous quantities,131 and is significantly interconnected with and interacts
with surface waters.132 Both groundwater and surface water can feed into the
other, and if either is contaminated, the other can be contaminated as a result.133
For instance, a surface stream may interact with groundwater in three basic
ways: it may (1) gain water from the inflow of groundwater through the
streambed; (2) lose water to groundwater via outflow to groundwater; or (3) both
129

Sanson, supra note 127.
Id.
131
According to the National Geographic Society, “[h]ydrologists estimate . . . U.S. groundwater reserves
to be at least 33,000 trillion gallons.” Groundwater Facts, NAT’L GROUND WATER ASS’N, https://www.ngwa.
org/what-is-groundwater/About-groundwater/groundwater-facts (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
132
See THOMAS C. WINTER, JUDSON W. HARVEY, O. LEHN FRANKE & WILLIAM M. ALLEY, GROUND
WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 1 (1998).
133
Id. (“For example, contaminated aquifers that discharge to streams can result in long-term
contamination of surface water; conversely, streams can be a major source of contamination to aquifers.”).
130
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gain and lose some water.134 How the water flows depends on the water table,135
as the altitude of the water table (below which is filled with groundwater)
determines whether groundwater will discharge into a stream channel or vice
versa.136 Either way, surface waters “constantly mix with underlying
groundwater, and this exchange facilitates chemical interactions that can affect
the characteristics of downstream aquatic systems.”137
While science has established that surface water and groundwater may
oftentimes feed into one another through hydraulic connection, “the interactions
are difficult to observe and measure and commonly have been ignored in watermanagement considerations and policies.”138 A practical limitation facing
prospective plaintiffs alleging CAFO contamination of surface waters via
groundwater is the burden of demonstrating a causal connection between the two
and establishing that contaminants found in the surface water originated from a
particular responsible CAFO.139
One of the most common ways to confirm a hydrological connection
between the groundwater and the surface water is via dye tracers, which “are
designed to answer the basic question of connection.”140 Dye tracers essentially
serve to add a label to groundwater, flagging it for when it ultimately turns up at
a different location.141 Fluorescent dyes are the most commonly used
groundwater tracers, as they are intrinsically low in toxicity and, importantly,
are “unambiguously and inexpensively detectable at very small
concentrations.”142 In fact, the Complaint filed by the plaintiffs in Kentucky

134

See id. at 9.
See Water Table, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC: RES. LIBRARY, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/
encyclopedia/water-table/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2021) (defining water table).
136
The water table must be higher in altitude compared to the stream channel for groundwater to discharge
into the stream channel and must conversely be lower than the altitude of the stream-water surface for surface
water to seep into groundwater. WINTER ET AL., supra note 132, at 9.
137
Shiigi, supra note 60, at 534 (citations omitted).
138
WINTER ET AL., supra note 132, at 1. Furthermore, different seasons and climate settings can affect the
streamflow between ground and surface waters. See id. at 12; see also Shiigi, supra note 60, at 535 (illustrating
how point sources can impact navigable surface waters through hydrologically connected groundwater).
139
Practically, a CAFO defending from such a claim could simply assert that there are many CAFOs in
the area, that its own system is kosher and not a contributing factor, and that it must be another CAFO
responsible. Of course, if all the operations in a certain area are owned by a single company, that potential
defense would be unavailable.
140
Todd R. Kincaid, Groundwater Tracing in the Woodville Karst Plain—Part I: An Overview of
Groundwater Tracing, GLOB. UNDERWATER EXPLORERS, https://www.gue.com/groundwater-tracing (last
visited Dec. 17, 2021).
141
Id.
142
Id.
135
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Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co.143 relied in part on dye trace
studies to determine that the surface waterbodies were hydrologically connected
to the ash ponds via groundwater.144 The study in Maui similarly involved
placing tracer dye into each of the injection wells “to see if and when the dye
would flow into the ocean.”145
Additionally, a number of scientific studies link CAFOs to groundwater
contamination. For instance, in 2006, a scientific study conclusively
demonstrated that CAFOs can contaminate shallow groundwater, finding
antibiotic-resistant E. coli strains present in groundwaters of swine farms with a
typical lagoon and land application system for waste management.146 There, four
site studies with known groundwater flow paths were monitored over the course
of one and a half years, and E. coli levels were found to be significantly higher
at the swine farm sites than at the reference sites.147
Once groundwater has been polluted, that water, like “[v]irtually all water,
polluted or not, eventually makes its way to navigable water.”148 Subsurface
water flow supplies “a significant portion of the total flow of many rivers, [so]
contaminated groundwater can be a source of contamination of surface
waters.”149 Additionally, studies have found that the movement of shallow
groundwater is lateral toward streams.150 For CAFOs, Dr. Michael Mallin
explains that “[t]he water in the aquifer will move downslope until it encounters
a surface-water body, generally streams.”151 In short, as much as we might think

143

905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018).
Complaint at 14, Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utils. Co., 303 F. Supp. 3d 530 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (No. 5:17cv-00292-DCR).
145
Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 984 (D. Haw. 2014).
146
M.E. Anderson & M.D. Sobsey, Detection and Occurrence of Antimicrobially Resistant E. Coli in
Groundwater on or Near Swine Farms in Eastern North Carolina, 54 WATER SCI. & TECH. 211, 218 (2006)
(available at https://dcr.lib.unc.edu/indexablecontent/uuid:11a17721-68c4-47a2-9951-b46630751c34)
147
E. coli is commonly used to indicate fecal contamination of water. Id.
148
County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1470 (2020). This pathway applies just as
much to groundwater. See generally VAN NOSTRAND’S SCIENTIFIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 1646–51 (8th ed. 1995)
(defining hydrology).
149
Michelle B. Nowlin, Sustainable Production of Swine: Putting Lipstick on a Pig, 37 VT. L. REV. 1079,
1088 (2013) (citing Michael Mallin, Impacts of Industrial Animal Production on Rivers and Estuaries, 88 AM.
SCIENTIST 2, 11 (2000)).
150
See, e.g., J. W. GILLIAM, R. L. HUFFMAN, R. B. DANIELS, D. E. BUFFINGTON, A. E. MOREY & S. A.
LECLERC, CONTAMINATION OF SURFICIAL AQUIFERS WITH NITROGEN APPLIED TO AGRICULTURAL LAND 1
(1996).
151
Adam Skolnick, The CAFO Industry’s Impact on the Environment and Public Health, SIERRA CLUB
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/2017-2-march-april/feature/cafo-industrys-impact-environmentand-public-health.
144
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of surface water and groundwater as distinct entities, we cannot ignore the reality
of their interconnectedness.
B. Testing Mechanisms to Establish Causation
CAFO point source pollution into groundwater can come from leaking
manure storage areas, and the pollutants that come with manure152 have a
number of properties that can serve as “fingerprints” of CAFO pollution.153 This
section discusses different pollutants, the mechanisms for measuring them, and
the effectiveness, reliability, and acceptance of those mechanisms.
Nitrate is the most frequently measured manure pollutant, as it is both (1) a
common pollutant associated with known health risks and (2) affordable to
measure using a range of available instruments.154 In the context of CAFOs,
however, nitrate testing has an important limitation. Nitrate can come from
several different sources beyond just CAFOs,155 and even if it were determined
that it came from a CAFO, testing would not be able to determine which
particular CAFO the nitrate is coming from if there are a number of nearby
CAFOs in the area.156
Another mechanism to track the source of water pollution is through
bacteria. Bacteria is a common indicator of manure pollution in groundwater,157
and advanced analysis of bacterial contamination can be done through Microbial
Source Tracking (MST).158 Utilizing different types of MST methods can
provide an accurate attribution of the bacteria to specified sources.159 For
152
Tarah Heinzen & Abel Russ, Using Emerging Pollution Tracking Methods to Address the Downstream
Impacts of Factory Farm Animal Welfare Abuse, 31 PACE ENV’T L. REV. 475, 488 (2014) (“The pollutants that
come with manure include nitrogen compounds (e.g., ammonia and nitrate), phosphorus compounds, bacteria,
and all of the pharmaceuticals that are used in the industrial animal-raising process, mainly antibiotics and
hormones.”).
153
Id.
154
Nitrate can be measured affordably and instantly with instruments such as colorimetric strips and
photometers. Heinzen & Russ, supra note 152, at 488–89. It can alternatively or additionally be sent to a
laboratory for more reliable analysis. See, e.g., 5.7 Nitrates, EPA: WATER: MONITORING & ASSESSMENT,
https://archive.epa.gov/water/archive/web/html/vms57.html (Mar. 6, 2012).
155
Nitrate might not necessarily be from, say, a storage pit of manure; because of its ubiquitous nature, it
could have come from another source like synthetic fertilizer application or a septic tank. Heinzen & Russ, supra
note 152, at 489.
156
Nitrate can remain in groundwater for years or decades, so its source is difficult to be determined with
certainty. See id. at 489–90.
157
Id. at 490.
158
MST encompasses many distinct methods, using both genotypic and phenotypic methods. Id.
159
Bacteroides PCR assays, a genotypic method, can accurately attribute fecal bacteria to human, bovine,
equine, or swine sources. Alice Layton, Larry McKay, Dan Williams, Victoria Garrett, Randall Gentry & Gary
Sayler, Development of Bacteroides 16S rRNA Gene TaqMan-Based Real-Time PCR Assays for Estimation of
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instance, genotypic methods are able to accurately attribute fecal bacteria to
specific sources,160 and phenotypic methods have been able to successfully
identify host species.161 Identifying source animals can also be tackled by “fecal
source tracking,” which analyzes mitochondrial DNA through application of
polymerase chain reactions (PCR).162
Livestock are commonly given various substances to maximize their growth
while shielding them from disease. A few additives worth mentioning include
antibiotics, hormones, and metals such as arsenic.163 Antibiotics, of course,
encourage livestock growth and stave off disease.164 With antibiotic use,
however, comes development of resistant strains of bacteria in the host animals’
digestive tracts.165 The technique of taking a water sample culturing the bacteria
can successfully identify host species and, combined with the MST approach,
has successfully mapped the migration of contamination from swine lagoons to
underlying groundwater.166 Furthermore, some antibiotics are exclusively used
in specific types of livestock, and therefore detection of those antibiotics in
ground and surface waters can evince that contamination originated from a
particular subset of animals.167 Hormones can indicate waste contamination, as

Total, Human, and Bovine Fecal Pollution in Water, 72 APPLIED & ENV’T MICROBIOLOGY 4214, 4215 (2006).
160
Heinzen & Russ, supra note 152, at 491 (showing 100% true-positive identification and 0% falsepositive identification, for a bovine assay (citing Layton, supra note 159, at 4220)).
161
See, e.g., Troy M. Scott, Joan B. Rose, Tracie M. Jenkins, Samuel R. Farrah & Jerzy Lukasik, Microbial
Source Tracking: Current Methodology and Future Directions, 68 APPLIED & ENV’T MICROBIOLOGY 5796,
5799 (2002) (detailing a study that identifies sources of fecal pollution by using antibiotic resistance profiles).
162
See William B. Schill & Melvin V. Mathes, Real-Time PCR Detection and Quantification of Nine
Potential Sources of Fecal Contamination by Analysis of Mitochondrial Cytochrome b Targets, 42 ENV’T SCI.
& TECH. 5229, 5231 (2008). PCR copies small segments of DNA that can then be used in a number of laboratory
and clinical techniques, including DNA fingerprinting and detection of bacteria or viruses. See generally
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Polymerase-Chain-Reaction-Fact-Sheet (Aug. 17, 2020)
(providing an overview on PCR).
163
EPA OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., EPA/600/R-04/042, RISK ASSESSMENT EVALUATION FOR CONCENTRATED
ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 24 (2004).
164
See generally The Facts About Antibiotics in Livestock & Poultry Production, N. AM. MEAT INST.,
https://www.meatinstitute.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/99943 (last visited Dec. 17, 2021)
(providing a brief overview of the role of antibiotics in livestock and poultry production).
165
See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, OFF. OF WATER, EPA 820-R-13-002, LITERATURE REVIEW OF
CONTAMINANTS IN LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY MANURE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER QUALITY 49–56 (2013).
166
See S. Koike, I. G. Drapac, H. D. Oliver, A. C. Yannarell, J. C. Chee-Sanford, R. I. Aminov & R. I.
Mackie, Monitoring and Source Tracking of Tetracycline Resistance Genes in Lagoons and Groundwater
Adjacent to Swine Production Facilities over a 3-Year Period, 73 APPLIED & ENV’T. MICROBIOLOGY 4813, 4813
(2007).
167
See EPA REGION 10 OFF. OF ENV’T ASSESSMENT, EPA 910-R-12-003, RELATION BETWEEN NITRATE
IN WATER WELLS AND POTENTIAL SOURCES IN THE LOWER YAKIMA VALLEY, WASH. 25 (2012) (illustrating
veterinary pharmaceuticals and their FDA-approved uses).
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researchers have been able to detect particular hormones,168 such as estrogen,
that are more likely to be associated with specific animal sources.169 When it
comes to metals, animal feeds often contain arsenic, copper, and zinc.170
Because the EPA has estimated that most of these metals are ultimately excreted,
signs of these metals can be traced back to feeding operations.171
C. Sufficiently Stating a Claim Against a Polluting CAFO
To successfully state a claim upon which relief can be granted, plaintiffs
should recognize that federal courts have shifted away from more liberal rules
to stricter requirements, such as stating facts giving rise to a “plausible” right to
relief.172 According to the Supreme Court, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”173 “Plausible” does not mean
probable; it merely requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.”174 Rather than just a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action or offerings of legal conclusions, the pleaded factual content
itself must lead to a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”175 Assessing the facts of a particular claim is a “context-

168
This identification process can be done via grab samples or, when hormone levels may be too variable
or dilute, in-stream monitors such as a Polar Organic Chemical Integrative Sampler (POCIS) to produce more
reliable calculations. See, e.g., T. L. Jones-Lepp, D. A. Alvarez, J. D. Petty & J. N. Huckins, Polar Organic
Chemical Integrative Sampling and Liquid Chromatography-Electrospray/Ion-Trap Mass Spectrometry for
Assessing Selected Prescription and Illicit Drugs in Treated Sewage Effluents, 47 ARCHIVES ENV’T
CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 427, 427 (2004); Ivo Černoch, Milan Fránek, Iva Diblíková, Klára
Hilscherová, Tomáš Randák, Tomáš Ocelka & Ludēk Bláha, POCIS Sampling in Combination with ELISA:
Screening of Sulfonamide Residues in Surface and Waste Waters, 14 J. ENV’T MONITORING 250, 253 (2012).
169
See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 167, at 27. For example, one hormone (17-α-estradiol) “is
predominantly produced by dairy cows and could be useful for source tracking.” Id. at 28.
170
See, e.g., Siamak Yazdankhah, Knut Rdui & Aksel Bernhoft, Zinc and Copper in Animal Feed—
Development of Resistance and Co-Resistance to Antimicrobial Agents in Bacteria of Animal Origin, 25
MICROBIAL ECOLOGY IN HEALTH AND DISEASE (2014); EPA OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., supra note 163.
171
See EPA, OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., EPA/600/R-04/042, RISK ASSESSMENT EVALUATION FOR
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS 46 (2004) (estimating that animals excrete roughly 80–90% of
the copper, zinc, and arsenic consumed).
172
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Compare Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) (“[A] complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”), with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (“[P]lausible grounds . . . simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence . . . .”), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (“[O]nly a complaint
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”).
173
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
174
Id.
175
Id.
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specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.”176
In the context of environmental litigation and, particularly, of alleging
CAFO contaminations of groundwater that feed into surface waters, the
requirements for stating a sufficient claim mean that a claimant likely would not
be able to merely allege, without more, that a particular CAFO is responsible for
polluting a waterbody. Rather, a claimant would need a factual showing to
support such an allegation, which would likely still need to withstand scientific
scrutiny to satisfy judicial admissibility.177 Thus, for potential CAFO claims
under the Maui doctrine, methodologies in manure-tracking are relevant and
essential. The availability of these methodologies makes stating a legally
cognizable claim far from an insurmountable burden post-Maui.
A prospective claimant may obtain water samples (either surface water
monitoring samples or groundwater monitoring samples) indicating
contamination and rely on scientific methods to demonstrate that her claim—
that the contamination originated from a particular CAFO—is more than mere
legal theory. To determine the admissibility of scientific evidence,178 federal
courts apply the Daubert factors, established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals.179 The four factors set forth in Daubert for the admission of a
theory or technique are: (1) “whether it can be (and has been) tested,” (2)
“whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication,” (3) “its known
or potential rate of error, and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation,” and (4) “general acceptance in the field
to which it belongs.”180 A court’s reception to the scientific basis behind the facts
driving an initial claim would ensure its survival against a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.181 Under considerations of these factors, source tracking methods
should survive judicial scrutiny and provide the necessary support to meet the
requirements for sufficiently stating a claim.182 Rapid advances in science have

176

Id. at 679.
See, e.g., Mulquin v. Nektar Therapeutics, 510 F. Supp. 3d 854, 873 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (granting
Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs failed to establish causation as to loss).
178
Although this Part discusses the framework for sufficiently stating a claim, we look to the Federal
Rules of Evidence insofar as it is useful in the analysis of whether a court would accept a claimant’s factual basis
for her legal claims at the outset of litigation.
179
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).
180
See id.
181
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
182
For a discussion and analysis of various source tracking methods and why they can likely pass the
Daubert test, see Heinzen & Russ, supra note 152 at 496–99.
177
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meant that cases involving water contamination “are becoming increasingly
viable as the law catches up with the state of the science.”183
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR BRINGING REAL-WORLD CAFOS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COMMUNITIES WITHIN THE SCOPE OF MAUI
Advances in science and the reliability of methods for identifying both the
hydrological connection and the pollutant source illustrate that claims against
CAFOs for groundwater pollution reaching jurisdictional surface waters are ripe
for consideration in light of Maui. This Part lays out both the framework for
subjecting CAFOs to the “functional equivalent” doctrine and the directives to
emphasize in reaching that result.
First, section A of this Part briefly summarizes the environmental justice
concerns184 when it comes to CAFOs, highlighting examples of real geographic
areas where minority and indigent groups disproportionately bear the negative
externalities of this industry. Section B examines how the cooperative
federalism structure of the Clean Water Act has failed these at-risk communities
until now. Section C then argues that CAFOs in these communities provide a
factual template that informs which CAFOs should fall under the “functional
equivalent” doctrine and thus be subject to NPDES permitting under the CWA.
This argument relies on (1) the interpretation of the scope of the CWA’s power
as derived from the Commerce Clause, (2) the CWA’s broad goals of protecting
the Nation’s waters, (3) the spirit of the Maui decision, and (4) directives that
this Comment argues should guide assessments of CAFOs under Maui. Later,
Part IV stresses that even if federal judges do not adopt the analysis offered in
this Part, individual states still have free rein through the public trust doctrine to
regulate groundwater discharges under the framework offered in this Part.
A. At-Risk Communities as the Primary Cost-Bearers of the Negative
Externalities
No one anywhere should have to live like this . . . . [CAFOs] are
located here because we are the path of least resistance, because we
do not have money, and we do not have a voice in the halls of power.
They assumed we would not fight back.
—Elsie Herring185

183

Id. at 499.
See infra Part III.A (defining environmental justice).
185
Building a 100 Percent Clean Economy: The Challenges of Facing Frontline Communities: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Env’t & Climate Change of the H. Comm. On Energy & Commerce, 116th Cong. (2019)
184
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The EPA defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income,
with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies.”186 Issues of environmental
justice under President Biden’s administration have come squarely into focus
and the administration has voiced a strong commitment to advancing
environmental justice goals and policies.187 Perhaps the most widelydocumented case of environmental justice concerns takes place in the state of
North Carolina, where many low-income and minority communities tend to lack
the political power and influence of their white, affluent counterparts, and are
thus more likely to be the sites burdened by undesirable CAFOs and their
deleterious effects.188 CAFOs in North Carolina are predominantly located in
the eastern region of the state near the coast,189 and the state is home to the top
two hog-producing counties in the entire United States.190 Duplin County, for
instance, is known as the “hog capital of the world”191 because it is home to more

(testimony of Elsie Herring, Community Activist, North Carolina Environmental Justice Network).
186
Environmental Justice, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice (Feb.
1, 2021). The official EPA website notes that environmental justice will be achieved when everyone enjoys
“[t]he same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards” and “[e]qual access to the decisionmaking process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work.” Id. See generally Renee Skelton
& Vernice Miller, The Environmental Justice Movement, NRDC (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/
stories/environmental-justice-movement (discussing the environmental justice movement and its progression).
187
See Press Release, The White House, FACT SHEET: President Biden Takes Executive Actions to
Tackle the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, Create Jobs, and Restore Scientific Integrity Across Federal
Government (Jan. 27, 2021) (on file at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/01/
27/fact-sheet-president-biden-takes-executive-actions-to-tackle-the-climate-crisis-at-home-and-abroad-createjobs-and-restore-scientific-integrity-across-federal-government/); Diamond Naga Siu, New EPA Picks Show
Commitment to Environmental Justice, LAW360 (Feb. 4, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1351483/
new-epa-picks-show-commitment-to-environmental-justice. See generally Juliet Eilperin, Brady Dennis &
Darryl Fears, Biden to Place Environmental Justice at Center of Sweeping Climate Plan, WASH. POST (Jan. 27,
2021, 12:51 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/01/26/biden-environmentaljustice-climate/ (discussing how the Biden Administration has made a focused effort to address environmental
justice).
188
Nicole, supra note 14; STEVE WING & JILL JOHNSTON, INDUSTRIAL HOG OPERATIONS IN NORTH
CAROLINA DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT AFRICAN-AMERICANS, HISPANICS AND AMERICAN INDIANS 1, 5
(2015) (“The percentages of Blacks, Hispanics and American Indians living within 3 miles of an industrial hog
operation are 1.54, 1.39 and 2.18 times higher, respectively, than the proportion of non-Hispanic Whites.”). See
generally Steve Wing, Gary Grant, Merle Green & Chris Stewart, Community Based Collaboration for
Environmental Justice: South-East Halifax Environmental Reawakening, 8 ENV’T & URBANIZATION 129, 131–
32 (1996) (describing environmental racism near hog production facilities).
189
See Update: Exposing Fields of Filth: Factory Farms Disproportionately Threaten Black, Latino, and
Native American North Carolinians, WATERKEEPER ALL. (July 30, 2020), https://waterkeeper.org/news/updateexposing-fields-of-filth/ (providing a diagram of where CAFOs in North Carolina are predominantly located).
190
Jennifer Shike, America’s Top 20 Pig Counties, PORK BUS. (July 7, 2019), https://www.porkbusiness.
com/news/hog-production/americas-top-20-pig-counties.
191
Julie Gueraseva, ‘What the Health’ Exposes How Corporate Greed Harms Public Health, LAIKA (June
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than two million confined pigs.192 In the state of North Carolina, Blacks,
Hispanics, and American Indians are, respectively, 1.40, 1.26, and 2.39 times
more likely to suffer the consequences of living within three miles of a swine
CAFO than non-Hispanic Whites.193 Swine CAFOs in North Carolina are
located closer to schools enrolling higher percentages of non-white and
economically disadvantaged students.194 The waste from the farms is stored in
lagoons, which are vast, open-air cesspools filled with untreated manure, urine,
and afterbirth.195 A lagoon can contain as much as twenty to forty-five million
gallons of wastewater, as animals in CAFOs generate hundreds of billions of
gallons of wet animal waste each year.196 Research has revealed more than 4,100
lagoons extending over 6,800 acres in North Carolina, “often located in lowlying spots near bodies of water.”197
In the context of water pollution,198 these CAFO operations can contaminate
both surface waters and groundwaters,199 either of which can contaminate the
other. The operations can200 also enter sources of drinking water, including
private drinking wells in rural communities.201 This contamination has brought
about a litany of negative consequences to these communities; in North Carolina,
CAFOs threaten lakes, rivers, and streams even during normal weather
conditions.202 In atypical conditions such as major flooding events, lagoon
breaches are more likely and such events, in turn, place millions of gallons of

1, 2017), http://laikamagazine.com/what-the-health-film-exposes-truth/.
192
Exposing Fields of Filth: After Hurricane, First Detailed Look at Flooding Feces-Laden N.C. Factory
Farms, ENV’T WORKING GRP. (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.ewg.org/research/exposing-fields-filth.
193
WING & JOHNSTON, supra note 188, at 6.
194
Maria C. Mirabelli, Steve Wing, Stephen W. Marshall & Timothy C. Wilcosky, Race, Poverty, and
Potential Exposure of Middle-School Students to Air Emissions from Confined Swine Feeding Operations, 114
ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 591, 595 (2006).
195
ROBBIN MARKS, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CESSPOOLS OF SHAME: HOW FACTORY FARM LAGOONS
AND SPRAYFIELDS THREATEN ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH 39 (2001), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/
default/files/cesspools.pdf.
196
Id. at 3. The waste from Robeson, Duplin, and Sampson County alone produces 4.4 billion gallons—
enough waste to fill 6,715 Olympic-sized swimming pools each year. Update: Exposing Fields of Filth, supra
note 189.
197
Exposing Fields of Filth in North Carolina: Landmark Report Maps Feces-Laden Hog and Chicken
Operations in North Carolina, ENV’T WORKING GRP. (June 21, 2016), http://www.ewg.org/research/exposingfields-filth-north-carolina.
198
This Comment recognizes the effects that CAFOs have on air pollution, including the production of
emissions that fuel climate change and the diminishing effects on the ambient air quality. However, it focuses
on water pollution and associated deleterious effects, and largely omits a discussion on air pollution.
199
See WINTER ET AL., supra note 132, at 1132.
200
See supra notes 132–34.
201
See, e.g., Wing et al., supra note 188, at 132, 137.
202
Ball-Blakely, supra note 3, at 5.
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hog manure into the water.203 Lagoons and sprayfields also regularly
compromise groundwater, whether it be a leak or breach in the infrastructure.204
In North Carolina, “[a]s the lagoons’ clay liners age[,] . . . they can leach into
the groundwater” and “the water can travel beneath the ground into surface
water.”205 These contaminants—whether nitrates, pathogens, metals, chemicals,
or hormones—can impose significant deleterious health risks on the human
population,206 particularly those with weakened immune systems who are at
special risk.207 The coastal regions of North Carolina have a high dependence on
well water for drinking,208 but many residents’ wells have been rendered
unusable.209
The disparate effects of CAFO pollution on indigent and minority
populations go beyond merely North Carolina, as other regions in the “Black
Belt” face similar practices.210 For instance, a study in Mississippi demonstrated
a high correlation between industrial hog operations and communities with
African Americans and persons in poverty.211 The study determined that “the
majority of the Mississippi’s industrial hog operations are located in areas with
high percentages of African Americans and persons in poverty,”212 which

203

See id.
See id.
205
Lisa Sorg, What’s in the Water?, N.C. POL’Y WATCH (Dec. 17, 2018), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/
2018/12/17/high-levels-of-bacteria-found-in-duplin-county-watershed/.
206
See Hribar, supra note 8, at 10.
207
Id. at 9. Hribar explains that “[t]hose at higher risk include infants or young children, pregnant women,
the elderly, and those who are immunosuppressed, HIV positive, or have had chemotherapy. This risk group
now roughly compromises 20% of the U.S. population.” Id.
208
See Wing, supra note 188, at 137.
209
See SoutheastEJ, NCEJN and Allies Respond to Latest Attack by Hog Industry, N.C. ENV’T JUST.
NETWORK (Jan. 6, 2017), http://www.ncejn.org/2017/01/ncejn-and-allies-respond-to-latest-attack-by-hog-industry/.
210
The Black Belt describes a crescent-shaped band that runs throughout the South where slaves
historically worked on plantations. See, e.g., Jay Reeves, In Poor Black Belt Region, Both Fears and Prayers
over Trump, AP NEWS (Feb. 25, 2017), https://apnews.com/article/f74bbdb4812b440a90bc52a579c60172
(displaying a graphic of areas considered to be part of the Black Belt).
211
Sacoby M. Wilson, Frank Howell, Steve Wing & Mark Sobsey, Environmental Injustice and the
Mississippi Hog Industry, 110 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 195, 200 (2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC1241163/pdf/ehp110s-000195.pdf. In this study, block groups designated 0–25% poverty and 0–
29% African American were the referent group, compared against this reference group. Adjusted for population
density, there were approximately three times as many CAFOs in high-poverty, low African American block
groups, and again approximately three times as many CAFOs in high African American, low-poverty groups
(with only 1.79 times as many CAFOs in block groups both high in poverty and African American, perhaps
because those areas may lack even the most basic political and economic infrastructure to attract industries—
even CAFOs). Id. at 199.
212
Id.
204
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“supports the idea that industrial pollution sources are disproportionately located
in proximity to non-White and low-income communities.”213
Beyond the Black Belt, environmental justice concerns pertaining to CAFOs
have not been extensively recognized and documented; however, even where
studies have shown inconclusive results, those studies have revealed other
disparate effects of CAFOs. A study published in 2016 sought to understand the
relationship between Iowa CAFOs and traditional environmental justice
variables such as low-income and minority populations.214 Even here, where
Iowa CAFO locations did not implicate those traditional environmental justice
groups, higher education was shown to provide a buffer against proximity to and
the effects of swine operations.215 It also bears mentioning that in the agricultural
industry, which includes the operation of CAFOs and AFOs,216 “[f]arm laborers
have lower levels of educational attainment, are more likely to be of Hispanic or
Mexican origin, and are less likely to be citizens than are workers in other
agricultural occupations or than the U.S. wage and salary workforce as a
whole.”217 As we can see, there is a greater need for equity in law and policy for
our vulnerable groups.
B. CAFO Pollution and the Shortcomings of States in the Cooperative
Relationship
You have people in power that are owned by the corporations—they’ve
taken so much money from them, even if they wanted to do better, the
industries would go after them.
—Naeema Muhammad218

213

Id.
Carrel et al., supra note 16, at 849.
215
See id. at 857 (finding that “Iowa CBGs within the highest two standard deviations of the distribution
of swine AU density are also CBGs where low percentages of people living in poverty or who are not white
reside but where the population has a high percentage of residents with less than a college education”).
216
See Hribar, supra note 8, at 1 (“A CAFO is a specific type of large-scale industrial agricultural facility
that raises animals . . . .”).
217
Farm Labor, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-labor/
#demographic (last visited Dec. 17, 2021). Although we do not have precise statistics on the percentage farm
workers that are Hispanic or another minority race in the specific context of CAFOs, data already associates
increased percentages of Hispanic and African American populations with increased odds of a nearby CAFO.
See, e.g., Jen Horton, The Siting of Hog CAFOs in Eastern North Carolina: A Case of Environmental Justice?
(Apr. 2012) (Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan) (available at https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/
handle/2027.42/90920/Jen_Horton_final2%5b1%5d.pdf?sequence=1&is Allowed=y).
218
Christina Cooke, Fighting Voter Suppression, Environmental Racism, and Corporate Agriculture in
Hog Country, CIVIL EATS (Oct. 22, 2020), https://civileats.com/2020/10/22/fighting-voter-suppression-environmentalracism-and-corporate-agriculture-in-hog-country/ (discussing why the state legislature does not put the interests
of the people first when it comes to holding agricultural operations responsible).
214

REN_1.31.22

594

1/31/2022 3:15 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71:563

States have failed to uphold their part of the cooperative relationship of
federalism by failing to adequately regulate both nonpoint sources and CAFOs
as point sources. The stated goal of the federal Clean Water Act is to “restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters,”219 but that same section of the Act emphasizes the “primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution.”220 This dual assignment of state and federal directives highlights the
operation of the CWA within a framework of cooperative federalism.221
Federalism expresses the principle that “the federal government is a government
of enumerated powers,” and “all authority not expressly granted to it is reserved
to the states or to the people.”222 Cooperative federalism is a corollary
proposition that state and federal governments can work in cooperation, each
acting in accord with their unique competencies and powers, to achieve a better
regulatory result.223
Cooperative federalism is at work in how the CWA regulates pollution that
reaches navigable waters,224 as well as in how the Act allows for states to take
on the federal government’s permitting authority.225 This statutory division of
labor has placed non-point source pollution beyond the ambit of federal
regulation, as “nationwide uniformity in controlling non-point source pollution
[is] virtually impossible” and “often depends on land use controls, which are
traditionally state or local in nature.”226 Groundwater, neither a point source nor
a navigable water for CWA purposes, is an area left to state regulations; the text
and history of the CWA suggest its deliberate exclusion from federal
regulation.227 Congress “elect[ed] to leave the subject to state law,”228 and its

219

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
Id. § 1251(b) (emphasis added).
221
For further reading on cooperative federalism and state participation in the context of the CWA, see
Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism and Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 33 ENV’T L.
113, 122–23 (2003).
222
Damien Schiff, Keeping the Clean Water Act Cooperatively Federal––Or, Why the Clean Water Act
Does Not Directly Regulate Groundwater Pollution, 42 WM & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 456 (2018).
223
Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 179,
184 (2005) (“Since the New Deal, cooperative federalism typically appears as congressional or administrative
efforts to induce . . . states to participate in a coordinated federal program.”).
224
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A).
225
See id. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g), (h).
226
Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Marc R. Poirier,
Non-Point Source Pollution, in ENV’T L. PRAC. GUIDE § 18.13 (2008)).
227
See Schiff, supra note 222, at 460–64 (explaining why, based on text and history, groundwater is not
included in the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters”).
228
Id.
220
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exclusion of groundwater from the definition of “navigable waters” is consistent
with the CWA’s cooperative federalism framework.229
When it comes to state regulation, a potential weakness in the proposition
that individual states are better informed and equipped to manage their own nonpoint source and groundwater pollution is that the individual states are not
always inclined to do so. For starters, “very few states enact requirements that
are significantly more stringent than the federal requirements.”230 For instance,
the State of North Carolina’s Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)
requires hog facilities of a certain size to have either a state permit or a NPDES
permit.231 While this requirement may seem reassuring, the state permits are
fundamentally flawed as they “are predicated on the legal fiction that regulated
facilities do not pollute public waters.”232 The common law has already evolved
into a catch-22 when it comes to CAFO enforcement, as CAFOs need to show
discharge to surface waters to be regulated.233 Similarly, the North Carolina
permit reflects this catch-22 and does not require surface water nor groundwater
monitoring, except when there is an observed permit violation.234
Some may wonder why states have regulated CAFOs so poorly under a
cooperative framework and failed to hold up their part of the cooperative
partnership, despite the awareness and documentation of these conditions.235
The simple answer is that the pork industry and similar meat industries are
economic fixtures in states such as North Carolina.236 The industry benefits from
shifting its negative externalities to surrounding communities, and states like

229
See Jason R. Jones, The Clean Water Act: Groundwater Regulation and the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System, 8 DICK. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 93, 111 (1999).
230
Emily A. Kolbe, “Won’t You Be My Neighbor”: Living with Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations,
99 IOWA L. REV. 415, 421 (2013).
231
See Animal Feeding Operations, N.C. DEP’T ENV’T QUALITY, https://deq.nc.gov/about/divisions/
water-resources/water-quality-permitting/animal-feeding-operations (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
232
D. Lee Miller & Ryke Longest, Reconciling Environmental Justice with Climate Change Mitigation:
A Case Study of NC Swine CAFOs, 21 VT. J. ENV’T L. 523, 528 (2020).
233
See Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 505 (2d Cir. 2005).
234
See DEP’T ENV’T QUALITY, N.C. ENV’T MGMT. COMM’N, SWINE WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
GENERAL PERMIT (2019) [hereinafter GENERAL PERMIT] (listing permit requirements, which include no ground
or surface water monitoring requirement). The draft general permits for these operations “continue to treat most
hog and poultry farms as ‘non-discharge.’” Sorg, supra note 205.
235
See Lindsay Walton & Kristen King Javien, Regulating CAFOs for the Well-Being of Farm Animals,
Consumers, and the Environment, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10485, 10487 (2020) (characterizing the industry as
“radically and uniquely unregulated”).
236
See, e.g., North Carolina Pork Industry Continues to Be Economic Powerhouse, NAT’L HOG FARMER
(Dec. 19, 2019), www.nationalhogfarmer.com/livestock/north-carolina-pork-industry-continues-be-economicpowerhouse.
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North Carolina make “no secret of [their] allegiance to Big Ag.”237 Farm
lobbyists exert significant influence over politicians to guard and promote the
interests of industrial agriculture, selling to the public the idea of protecting
small family farms, which largely no longer exist thanks to Big Ag itself.238 In
North Carolina, complaints have fallen upon deaf ears239 and community
members who have attempted to mobilize against and investigate CAFOs have
been subject to harassment tactics, including sustained tailgating, yelling, threats
of gun and other physical violence, and harassers driving back and forth in front
of their houses.240 Indeed, not only have some states done nothing under this
cooperative relationship to regulate CAFO pollution, but many have also utilized
state laws—including “ag-gag”241 and “right-to-farm”242 laws—to make it
harder for the aggrieved communities to recover relief for their harms.243
C. Successfully Applying the Maui Test to Real-World CAFOs
The Court’s balanced approach in resolving County of Maui v.
Hawaii Wildlife Fund provides hope that lower courts will decide
future Clean Water Act cases consistent with Congress’s words and
purpose—and will not be swayed by overblown rhetoric from
polluters wishing to dodge responsibility for keeping the nation’s
waters healthy.
—Jon Devine & David Henkin244

237

Ball-Blakely, supra note 3, at 10.
See Sisneros-Lobato, supra note 2; see also Ball-Blakely, supra note 3, at 9 (“[B]ecause Big Ag has
convinced the country that industrial farms are small family farms, it is all too easy to characterize governmental
regulations as the big boot of the Federal Government standing on the little guy’s throat.”).
239
Gray Jernigan, What to Do When State Regulation Stinks, WATERKEEPER MAG., 2015, at 33, 34,
https://waterkeeper.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/WKMagSummer15r14-small1.pdf.
240
See Lisa Sorg, EPA to NC DEQ: “Grave Concerns” About Swine Industry’s Intimidation of Minority
Residents, N.C. POL’Y WATCH (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2017/01/25/epa-nc-deq-graveconcerns-swine-industrys-intimidation-minority-residents/. In one egregious incident, a CAFO operator entered
the home of an elderly woman and “sh[ook] the chair she sat in while threatening her and her family with physical
violence if they continued to complain about the odors and spray.” Sue Sturgis, A Step Toward Environmental
Justice in North Carolina’s Hog Country, FACING S. (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.facingsouth.org/2017/02/steptoward-environmental-justice-north-carolinas-hog-country.
241
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In June 2020, a coalition of organizations challenged North
Carolina’s ag-gag law on First Amendment free speech rights and succeeded. See Victory: North Carolina AgGag Law Struck Down as Unconstitutional, ASPCA (June 15, 2020), https://www.aspca.org/news/victorynorth-carolina-ag-gag-law-struck-down-unconstitutional.
242
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
243
For an example of a right-to-farm statute that protects swine operations, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106701 (2018).
244
Jon Devine & David Henkin, Closing a Concocted Clean Water Act Loophole, REGUL. REV. (July 20,
2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/07/20/devine-henkin-closing-concocted-clean-water-act-loophole/.
238
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This section argues that CAFOs that contaminate groundwater, when
analyzed under Maui’s “functional equivalence” doctrine, should be subject to
the CWA and its NPDES permitting scheme. It begins by analyzing a threshold
question of how far the CWA can extend to point source discharges into
groundwater, given that groundwater is not itself a “navigable water.” It then
highlights actual-world regions and CAFOs (here, illustrating the application of
Maui through CAFOs in eastern North Carolina), tackling the question of
whether it should extend to those CAFOs in those fact-specific circumstances,
ultimately answering in the affirmative.
1. A Broad Maui Interpretation Would Not Exceed the Clean Water Act
Regulatory Regime
A broad application of Maui is unlikely to encounter serious pushback. The
Maui decision unequivocally confirms that the CWA can in some instances
apply to groundwater that reaches jurisdictional surface waters; however, the
aforementioned caselaw has primarily addressed the question of how far the
CWA chooses to regulate groundwater in fact, not the question of how far the
CWA could go in regulating groundwater. This Comment now emphasizes that
wherever this ceiling exists, even a broad, expansive interpretation of
“functional equivalent” is well within the constitutional limitations of how much
courts could stretch Maui. Because Maui provided several non-exhaustive
factors in determining whether “functional equivalence” applies in a particular
case, this subpart clarifies that “functional equivalent” determinations, however
broadly interpreted, do not run afoul of constitutional limitations.245
The federal government’s authority over this vast regulatory regime derives
from the Commerce Clause, which “[t]he CWA depends entirely on . . . for
support.”246 The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the
channels, instrumentalities, and activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.247 The channels of interstate commerce refer to the modes
of “interstate and foreign commerce.”248 Insofar as waterbodies are capable of

245
By “constitutional limitations,” this Comment means limitations upon the federal government to
legislate in an area beyond its enumerated powers.
246
Calvert G. Chipchase, The Clean Water Act: What’s Commerce Got to Do with It?, 33 ENV’T L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10775, 10779 (2003); see also Stanley A. Millan, The Odd Couple: The High Court’s
Expansion of Environmental Standing in Waters but Contraction of Regulatory Jurisdiction Over Them, 47 LOY.
L. REV. 729, 745 (2001) (“The federal government’s regulatory jurisdiction over navigable waters is based on
[the Commerce Clause].”).
247
See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
248
Id. at 560.
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facilitating the movement of persons and goods across state or national borders,
those waterbodies constitute a “channel” of interstate commerce.249
CWA regulation of groundwater in the Maui context is permissible under
Commerce Clause powers because Maui and the prominent challenges
immediately antecedent to Maui are only concerned with groundwater that
reaches jurisdictional surface water.250 The precondition that the groundwater
reaches surface water establishes the necessary jurisdictional hook for federal
regulations to attach.251 When the EPA in its 2019 Interpretive Statement
reversed from its longstanding position that the CWA should be interpreted to
cover groundwater in connection to jurisdictional surface waters, the EPA
understood that there is such a power to regulate this groundwater, stating
“Congress intentionally chose to exclude all releases of pollutants to
groundwater from the NPDES program, even where pollutants are conveyed to
jurisdictional surface waters via groundwater.”252 This language points to a
position of elective forbearance when it comes to regulating groundwater that
reaches surface water, indicating the power of the CWA to regulate such waters
if it were so inclined to do so.253 That is, even if we assumed that Congress
categorically elected to not regulate groundwater (a proposition that the Supreme
Court ultimately held in Maui to be erroneous), that does not mean that Congress
could not have done so. In fact, courts did not entertain arguments—in Maui or
in those challenges immediately antecedent to Maui254—that such an application
of the CWA exceeds the authority granted under the Commerce Clause.255
How much power does the CWA have under the Commerce Clause to
regulate groundwater in connection with jurisdictional surface waters?
Whatever the theoretical limits of the CWA’s power to regulate groundwater in

249
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Henderson,
J., concurring) (“[Where] the object of the regulation was necessarily connected to movement of persons or
things interstate . . . [the regulation] could therefore be characterized as regulation of the channels of
commerce.”).
250
County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020).
251
Tara M. Stuckey, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal
Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101, 2102 (2006). As Tara M. Stucky explains,
“A jurisdictional hook is a statutory clause requiring that the regulated activity have a connection with interstate
commerce.” Id.
252
Interpretive Statement on Application of the Clean Water Act National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Program to Releases of Pollutants from a Point Source to Groundwater, 84 Fed. Reg. 16,810, 16,811
(proposed Apr. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 122) (emphasis added).
253
See generally id. at 16,813, 16,815, 16,816 (positing at multiple points that Congress chose to leave
groundwater to state regulation).
254
See supra Part I (discussing the cases this Comment considers to be immediately antecedent to Maui).
255
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Maui, 140 S. Ct. 1462 (No. 18-260).
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connection to jurisdictional surface waters might be under the Commerce
Clause, it is not necessary to determine with utmost precision at this time;
presently, it is enough that the Maui decision and its “functional equivalent” test
are permissible under the CWA.256 Still, this power to regulate under Maui is
amorphous in that Maui’s list of non-exhaustive factors gives courts broad
discretion to apply Maui. That discretion in determining whether “functional
equivalent” exists, if applied liberally, is unlikely to run afoul of the CWA’s
powers under the Commerce Clause, given that other more expansive tests,
including the “fairly traceable”257 and “direct hydrological connection”258 tests,
have not faced challenges related to exceeding the regulatory power of
Congress.259 As these more expansive standards are within the power of federal
regulation, even a broad interpretation of the much narrower Maui test certainly
suffices.
Courts have broad authority to make judicial determinations on whether factspecific applications of the Maui test adequately make out a case for “functional
equivalence.”260 Because courts have discretion in this matter, and because that
discretion, even liberally applied, would not violate the regulatory authority of
the CWA under the Commerce Clause, “functional equivalence” can be defined
and determined by the courts,261 subject to practical limitations.262

256

Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1468.
See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018) (utilizing a “fairly
traceable” test).
258
See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 651 (4th Cir. 2018)
(utilizing a “direct hydrological connection” test).
259
Those cases involved challenges on whether the Clean Water Act should be interpreted to encompass
groundwater in connection to surface water, not whether the Clean Water Act can regulate that groundwater.
260
This observation is an unassuming acknowledgement of the power of federal courts when it comes to
resolution of legal questions. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 137 (1803) (“It is emphatically the duty of
the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”).
261
This idea that a determination may be whatever a governmental body declares to be the case is found,
for instance, when discussing presidential impeachment. Gerald Ford famously declared that “an impeachable
offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history.”
U.S. SENATE, IMPEACHMENT: THE SENATE’S IMPEACHMENT ROLE, https://www.senate.gov/about/powersprocedures/impeachment/senate-impeachment-role.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
262
Justice Breyer, writing the Maui opinion, opined that “[i]f the pipe ends 50 miles from navigable waters
and the pipe emits pollutants that travel with groundwater, mix with much other material, and end up in navigable
waters only many years later, the permitting requirements likely do not apply.” County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife
Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1476 (2020). Although not dispositive, Justice Breyer’s musings might hold value insofar
as they provide a reference that may serve as a persuasive parameter for lower courts to consider.
257
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2. Existing CAFOs in Eastern North Carolina and the Proposed
Application of Maui
This subsection looks at CAFOs in the eastern coastal region of North
Carolina, where hog farms are primarily situated in the state and where some of
the most egregious environmental justice violations are sited. It will highlight
how closely some CAFOs are sited to jurisdictional surface waters and the
suitability of similarly situated CAFOs for a potential Maui application.263
a. Region of Focus as a Case Study: Northeast Cape Fear River and
Nearby CAFOs
Stocking Head Creek is a stream located in Duplin County that originates
from beneath the ground just south of Kenansville in Duplin County and ends
about fourteen miles away just northeast of Chinquapin, NC, where it converges
with Muddy Creek and feeds into the Northeast Cape Fear River.264 It is part of
the Cape Fear River Basin watershed, where 94,000 swine and 1.3 million
broiler chickens live in confinement.265 The Northeast Cape Fear River is a
tributary to the Cape Fear River and is navigable-in-fact.266 It runs for about 130
miles through the southeastern coastal plains of North Carolina.267 The Cape
Fear River is a blackwater river268 located in east central North Carolina that
flows into the Atlantic Ocean near Cape Fear, from which it takes its name.269 It
additionally serves as a part of the route of the Intracoastal Waterway.270 The
263
This Comment does not purport to find legal challenges in the particular, but rather the abstract. Insofar
as it discusses particular CAFOs in the context of Maui, this Comment aims to show, broadly, that there are
some CAFOs against which claimants can allege a compelling Maui challenge. Nothing in this Comment should
be construed to theorize that challenges against any specific CAFO are likely to succeed, given the practical
imperfections that would inhere in making such a determination in the abstract before making scientific findings
in the particular—including lack of testing, details surrounding groundwater flow, and other facts and
documentation unavailable to us at this juncture.
264
Sorg, supra note 205.
265
Kemp Burdette, Waterways Already Are in Peril; Don’t Make Them Worse, STARNEWS ONLINE
(Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.starnewsonline.com/opinion/20190412/kemp-burdette-waterways-already-are-inperil-dont-make-them-worse.
266
See, e.g., Caitie Forde-Smith, Northeast Cape Fear River, COASTAL REV. (Apr. 4, 2013), https://www.
coastalreview.org/2013/04/our-coast-northeast-cape-fear-river/ (describing a wilderness area guide who offers
guided boat tours on the Northeast Cape Fear River).
267
Id.
268
A blackwater river is a river that typically is slow-moving, flowing through forests, swamps, or
wetlands. See generally Tannins and Blackwater Rivers, OGEECHEE RIVERKEEPER (May 29, 2020), https://www.
ogeecheeriverkeeper.org/tannins-and-blackwater-rivers/ (describing blackwater rivers and their composition).
269
Cape Fear River, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Cape-Fear-River (last visited Dec.
17, 2021).
270
See North Carolina Intracoastal Waterway, COASTAL GUIDE (last visited Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.
coastalguide.com/north-carolina-intracoastal-waterway.html.
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river is navigable-in-fact and employs a series of locks and dams to aid in its
navigability.271
On April 21, 2020, the EPA published a Final Rule defining the scope of
waters federally regulated under the CWA.272 The 2020 WOTUS Rule
interpreted “‘waters of the United States’ to encompass: The territorial seas and
traditional navigable waters; perennial and intermittent tributaries that
contribute surface water flow to such waters; certain lakes, ponds, and
impoundments of jurisdictional waters; and wetlands adjacent to other
jurisdictional waters.”273 Stocking Head Creek, on its roughly fourteen-mile
journey through Duplin County, passes through an agglomeration of
industrialized animal farms on its way to the Northeast Cape Fear River.274
Fortunately, Stocking Head Creek is a permanent stream that fits into the EPA’s
new definition of “waters of the United States.”275 Because it is a jurisdictional
surface water, Maui applies where there is a “functional equivalent” of a direct
discharge into Stocking Head Creek and such a discharge would be subject to
the permitting requirements of the CWA.276
Most of the many CAFOs that are located within a mere two miles of
Stocking Head Creek are covered under the N.C. Department of Environmental
Quality’s Swine Waste Management System General Permit.277 Upon first
impression, this regulatory burden may seem stringent but upon closer
inspection is fundamentally flawed because it fails to deliver its facial promises
to protect North Carolina. As already mentioned, DEQ’s swine permits are
flawed because they are classified as non-discharge facilities,278 and thus no
water monitoring is required unless regulators observe permit violations.279
Therefore, animal feeding operations presumptively do not discharge into

271
See, e.g., Denice Patterson, Navigating the Cape Fear: Locks Are Key, COASTAL REV. (Sept. 25, 2015),
https://www.coastalreview.org/2015/09/navigating-the-cape-fear-locks-are-key/ (providing a brief history and
illustrative examples of locks and dams on the Cape Fear River).
272
85 Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts 110, 112, 116, 117, 120,
122, 230, 232, 300, 302, and 401) [hereinafter “2020 WOTUS Rule”].
273
Id. at 22,251 (emphasis added).
274
Stocking Head Creek, N.C., GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (search “Stocking Head Creek,
N.C.”).
275
See Stocking Head Creek Watershed Study, N.C. DEP’T OF ENV’T QUALITY, https://deq.nc.gov/about/
divisions/water-resources/water-resources-data/water-sciences-home-page/shc-study (last visited Dec. 17,
2021).
276
See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1474 (2020).
277
GENERAL PERMIT, supra note 234, at 1.
278
See id. (listing permit requirements).
279
See Miller & Longest, supra note 232 (discussing how DEQ’s swine permits are flawed and how that
regulatory scheme results in regulated facilities to pollute waters without accountability).
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surface waters and are not required to take action (i.e., monitor the water) to
rebut that presumption and consequently alter their regulatory paradigm.
Appendix 1 illustrates just a few permitted animal facilities, all located within
two miles of Stocking Head Creek.280
As many as half of all CAFO lagoons are leaking into groundwater.281 In
instances where the methods of establishing causation reveal surface water
pollution that can be tied to groundwater pollution by a CAFO or a group of
CAFOs, and where the sites are so close in geographic proximity to surface
waters (as is demonstrably the case with Stocking Head Creek), the “functional
equivalence” test can likely be applied. In an industry devoid of real regulation
and for underprivileged communities devoid of adequate remedies,282 there is a
prime opportunity to apply Maui in a way that brings CAFOs squarely within
Maui’s scope. When applied to CAFO pollution of surface waters via
groundwater, an opportunity arises for Maui to be a promising tool that fights
for protecting America’s waters as the CWA intended.283 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Maui is an opportunity to carry out CWA’s goals. Lower courts
around the country, including in regions like coastal North Carolina, have the
chance to follow through on those promises. The fact-specific test that Maui has
provided, applied faithfully, does not provide a wholesale fix of American water
pollution but is still a meaningful step in the right direction towards protection
of precarious American waterways. To aid in doing so, courts need to make the
right inquiries when applying the fact-specific, non-exhaustive Maui test.
3. Proposal: An Interpretive Directive Guiding “Functional Equivalent”
Determinations
The Supreme Court in Maui opined on a number of potential factors in
making a “functional equivalent” determination and noted that time and distance
would be most important in most cases.284 For CAFOs that pollute into
groundwater, each CAFO boasts its own set of factual circumstances in terms of
where it discharges into the water table, how that water in turn flows from
groundwater into surface water, and how far away it is located from the surface

280

See app. 1.
Joby Warrick & Pat Stith, New Studies Show that Lagoons Are Leaking: Groundwater, Rivers Affected
by Waste, NEWS & OBSERVER (Feb. 19, 1995), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners/news-observer-raleigh-nc.
282
See generally supra Part I.A (discussing limitations when it comes to enforcing CAFO pollution).
283
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (declaring that the Act’s goal is “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”).
284
County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1477 (2020) (“Time and distance will be the
most important factor in most cases, but not necessarily every case.”).
281
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water, among other circumstances. While courts can wade through potential
claims anew on a case-by-case basis, courts should develop directives that make
at least some cases relatively straightforward.
Establishing baselines is a way that “keeps easy cases easy.”285 Although
Justice Scalia penned this memorable quote in a case discussion of Fourth
Amendment rights,286 its underlying principle of promoting judicial clarity and
consistency via legal baselines has applicable value here. In making
determinations on “functional equivalence” for CAFO groundwater pollution,
courts should establish baseline distances and travel times within which
discharges ought to be presumptively the “functional equivalent” of a direct
discharge.287 Defendants can overcome this presumption of satisfying
“functional equivalence” by a clear demonstration that other factors
overwhelmingly weigh against applicability of the Maui test. But having a
baseline presumption in place would make many cases more straightforward,
keeping the easy cases easy while discouraging a flood of litigation.
The interpretive directive of a presumptive finding of “functional
equivalence” could prove to be a very meaningful tool, but it needs to make the
right inquiries. We presently focus on time and distance, using the two factors
that the Supreme Court noted would be most important in a majority of cases.288
When it comes to time and distance, the Court gave an extreme example of when
it would be “surprising, even bizarre” to regulate: “the 100-year migration of
pollutants through 250 miles of groundwater to a river.”289 It later gave an
example of what would and would not be appropriate to regulate, offering the
following:
Where a pipe ends a few feet from navigable waters and the pipe emits
pollutants that travel those few feet through groundwater (or over the
beach), the permitting requirement clearly applies. If the pipe ends 50
miles from navigable waters and the pipe emits pollutants that travel
with groundwater, mix with much other material, and end up in
navigable waters only many years later, the permitting requirements
likely do not apply.290

285
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (“One virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights
baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”).
286
See generally id. (analyzing a Fourth Amendment case involving a dog sniff on one’s property).
287
This Comment will also refer to this interpretive directive as the “functional equivalent presumption.”
288
Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1476.
289
Id. at 1471.
290
Id. at 1476.
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On the conservative spectrum of guidance as to what does not amount to a
“functional equivalent” determination, fifty miles might be too far regarding
assessments of distance; temporally, “many years” might be too long. And
conversely, as to what would amount to a “functional equivalent” determination,
the test “clearly applies” if the pollutants traveled only a “few feet through
groundwater.”291 Where does that leave us? Potential claimants and defendants
both lack real clarity and guidance amidst the chasm of gray.
This Comment proposes that courts confronted with a “functional
equivalence” inquiry adopt an interpretative directive under which discharges
into groundwater are presumptively the “functional equivalent” of a direct
discharge if discharges into groundwater (1) are located within one mile of a
jurisdictional surface water; (2) travel downgradient in a path that directly feeds
into the jurisdictional surface water; and (3) travel with a migration time
measurable in days, weeks, or months, as opposed to years. Such a presumption
would be surmountable on a case-by-case basis. The Court in Maui left
“functional equivalent” determinations to a case-by-case basis, and there are
some cases that this Comment argues clearly fit within a baseline of that test.
This functional equivalent presumption squarely emphasizes the two factors—
time and distance—deemed by the Maui court to be the most important factors,
most of the time, in “functional equivalence determinations.”292 The other five
enumerated considerations (which have been explicitly considered to have less
weight in most circumstances),293 along with any unlisted considerations in the
Supreme Court’s admittedly non-exhaustive list, still have a potentially
enormous situational utility in rebutting a presumption (or, conversely, in further
validating that presumption) that “functional equivalence” has been established.
It is also worth clarifying that this proposal is not a new test, but rather an
easy tool to use to help courts faithfully interpret Maui and the current
“functional equivalent” test; this Comment does not advocate for the
establishment of presumptive baselines instead of a case-by-case analysis, but
rather is offering a framework under which these baselines exist within the caseby-case analysis already set forth by the Supreme Court.294 Legal presumptions

291

Id.
See id. at 1476–77.
293
The other five listed considerations are: (1) “the nature of the material through which the pollutant
travels,” (2) “the extent to which the pollutant is diluted or chemically changed as it travels,” (3) “the amount of
pollutant entering the navigable waters relative to the amount of the pollutant that leaves the point source,” (4)
“the manner by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable waters,” and (5) “the degree to which the
pollution (at that point) has maintained its specific identity.” Id. at 1476.
294
See id.
292
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are commonplace in American jurisprudence and littered in virtually every area
of law.295
When we look to the Maui decision and the Court’s hypothetical examples
of what constitutes a “functional equivalent,”296 the directive offered here is, in
a way, reading out a rule implicit in the Court’s decision. This directive shaping
the “functional equivalence” presumption highlights the reality that there may
be some instances where the facts appear obvious enough to presume “functional
equivalence,” so stating those instances offers industry confidence and judicial
clarity; however, because this is still a case-by-case inquiry, interested parties
are invited to rebut that presumption.297 This directive in practice would, on the
easy cases, essentially serve to establish a burden-shifting framework—one in
which the burden shifts from the claimant (to argue that the discharge is the
“functional equivalent” of a direct discharge) to the polluter (to rebut a finding
of “functional equivalence”). Where there is a potentially viable claim, this
burden-shifting framework would likely encourage potential claimants (who
might otherwise lack confidence in the Maui test) to assert a claim under the
CWA.
An interpretive guidance like the CAFO “functional equivalence”
presumption offered by this Comment would further the spirit of Maui and the
CWA by ensuring that the caselaw faithfully works to protect at-risk
communities, particularly when there is, in fact, an actual “functional
equivalent” of a direct discharge. This directive would promote regulation of
CAFOs similar in characteristics to the eastern North Carolina CAFOs listed in
Appendix 1, as a significant number of them, at minimum, would fall squarely
within the temporal component of this rule. By including CAFOs within the
application of Maui and by prudently extending that application—
conservatively enough to not overrun either the law or spirit of Maui, but
liberally enough to cover a generous number of polluting CAFOs—these
environmental justice communities can be afforded a new doctrinal tool that can
provide meaningful help to them, even if it might not be a savior to all of their
295
See, e.g., William J. Rawlings, Legal Effect of Presumptions and Inferences, 2 S.D. L. REV. 76, 76
(1957) (discussing legal presumptions). One of the most widely quoted presumptions is that an accused person
is presumed innocent until proven guilty. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978).
296
See Maui, 140 S. Ct. at 1476.
297
A rebuttable presumption in the law is an assumption that will be accepted as true unless someone
proves otherwise. There are countless rebuttable presumptions, littered in virtually every area of law. A
quintessential example is that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. A less well-known example is that in
actions for a vaccine-related injury or death in Colorado, there is a rebuttable presumption that the injury or
death was not due to the vaccine if the injury or death does not fall within the parameters of the vaccine injury
table set forth in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-4-909(4).
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woes.298 Perhaps most importantly, this directive would provide helpful
guidance moving forward on interpreting what appears to be a very murky area
of CWA jurisprudence , keeping the “easy cases easy”299 for potential claimants,
defendants, and judges around the country.
IV. BEYOND CAFOS, BEYOND MAUI
This Comment focuses on applying the Maui test to CAFOs and suggests a
framework for doing so. However, the utility of this Comment can stretch
beyond CAFOs, both for other sources of groundwater pollution under Maui300
and for individual states to draw upon when reforming state-level regulations of
groundwater protection. State legislatures can adopt regulations for CAFOs that
fall within this suggested presumption or a similar one, perhaps with stricter
lagoon standards with respect to the design of the lagoons themselves.
Alternatively, state law can establish presumptions of discharge for CAFOs that
fall under this suggested presumption or a similar one.301
Action by the post-Trump EPA offers another avenue to adopt an
interpretive guidance like the CAFO “functional equivalence” presumption
advanced by this Comment. By issuing a draft guidance similar (in procedural
form but not in substance) to the one already offered by the Trump
Administration,302 subsequent administrations can provide clarity for the courts,
federal agencies, claimants, and potential defendants. The EPA can even adopt
these guidelines in the form of a general permit.
CONCLUSION
Maui was explicitly directed towards closing loopholes inconsistent with the
spirit of the CWA. In the context of CAFOs, these lagoons could be considered
298
Even with successful situational Maui challenges against CAFOs for groundwater challenges, these
communities still must deal with many other issues, including direct discharges to surface waters, lack of
adequate information and enforcement, and any potential RCRA or Clean Air Act violations that continue to
malign their health and quality of life.
299
See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
300
The main general prescriptive concept advanced in this Comment—that courts, when applying a Maui
analysis, adopt presumptions that make “the easy cases easy”—can find applications in other sectors such as
coal ash ponds or waste treatment plants, but we do not advance the viability of those applications beyond noting
here the potential utility of this Comment in such an endeavor. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013)
(“One virtue of the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy cases easy.”).
301
A state could require, for example, that any CAFO located within one mile of a jurisdictional waterbody
has a presumption of discharge, legislating to offset the presumption that CAFOs do not discharge.
302
See supra Part I.B.5 (discussing the EPA guidance memorandum promulgated under the Trump
Administration).
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an example of such an intolerable loophole. Storing massive quantities of animal
waste in such a location (e.g., poorly constructed lagoons with dilapidated clay
liners) is a definite way to pollute the groundwater and, in many cases, surface
water located less than perhaps a half-mile down the road. In Maui, the Supreme
Court opened the door for lower courts to either broadly combat water pollution
or narrowly limit the test’s application. A narrow application of Maui would
allow polluters to continue dodging their responsibility to maintain the health of
the nation’s waters. This Comment’s proposed interpretive guidance offers an
avenue to faithfully effectuate the purpose of the nation’s laws to meaningfully
protect one of its most important and ever-threatened resources.
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APPENDIX303

303
This Appendix displays certain CAFO location sites in Stocking Head Creek (“SHC”) to highlight how
close CAFOs are oftentimes located to jurisdictional bodies of water.

